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Introduction: Indochina
- - ~ - ~ - ~ - -
In 1867 France had conquered two countries of southeast-
ern Asia, Cambodia and Viet-name That year, she placed them
under the authority of a Governor General, and named the whole
territory French Indochina. To this possession, the French
added, in 1893, a third country, Laos, after a long struggle
with Thailand. 1
Moreover, after the occupation ot Viet-nam, the French
had intentionally divided this country in three administrative
units and gave to each one of them a name, referring to north
Viet·nam as Tonkin, to ce11tral Viet-aam as Annam, and tosou.th
Viet-nam as Oochlnchina. ~
Consequently, in history and geography text-books, it
was s~lid that French Indochina consisted of five distinct
regions: Tonkin, A·nnam, Cochinchina, Cambodia and Laos, as
though Viet-nam d1d not exist, afid tha~ Tonkin, Annam and
Cochinchina were separated cou~trie8.3
According to this artificial make-up, French Indochina
-------1. Andre Masson.Bistoire de ItIndochina Francalse,p.96
2. Tran-du.c-~hao,...:;lI'LesRelatIons Fr·aneo-Vletnamlennes" t
~ !gmps Modemes', XVIll, March. 19"7,p.1059,no1ie 1 •
• See,?orexample,Canada Department of Mines and Tech-
nical Sur~eys,.Indochina.J' Geographical Appreciatlon,p.4;
or Alb&rt,de P,OuvoQ~~111e, LtAnham1te~ p.35.
was an area or 2e8.600 square miles. south or China, east
of Burma and Thailand, north 01' the Gult of Thailand and
west or the China Sea.
The Indochinese peninsl1la is mostly mountainous. Its
physiography is dominated by the uplands which cover more
than one half 01' the.total area. The mountains stand on
the border of China. ~hey spread over Tonkin and Laos.
They go south by the Annam Cordillera which forms a natural
border between Annam and Laos and a backboae of Indochina.
4In Cambodia there is a range of plateaux along the coast.
Almost all the uplands of Indochina are forests which
occupy about 120,000 square mil~s. or more tban 40 per cent
of the territory_ About 33 per cent ot these forests are
still inaccessible to the population. In the accessible
parts. the mountain tribes practice a snitting cUltivation.
locally called Ill- Forests are but~d to make fields for
czops , In a tew years. when the soil is exnaustied , people
set forth for another clearing. About 16 per cent of the
forested area bas been atfected by this practice. 5
More important tor Indoe~lna than its topography are
its river systems. Two great rivers actually torm two great
deltas which feed the popUlation 01' lndochina and especially
of Vietnam. They are the Hong-ha (Red River) in the North
1 .r. °7~~\,~(~·~~t,,~~~.(~~'l 'T ,:'J".!·,jl,",)t~'~'~l·~~~'~t·,::.~:~:J.'~.~.:. '-?·.~J·_-~r·h ~ t-~~.:" ~
" '3'", "':4,~",t,e~;n~Q;i~n :.G~~ernment, 'oj? :'clt'~ ,pp: "'11:"12". -.' ~,
.. . 'l)~ lbid'~: pp .19-20
3and the Cuulong (Mekong) in the South.
The Hong-ha is an abrupt current, with a total length
of about 720 miles. It flows in a deep structural trough
in its upper course. But when it leaves the mountains, its
waters usually outrun its banks in the rainy season, i.e.,
trom June to Ootober each year. To keep back tloods,embank-
ments are built. These' embankments decrease i~ height down-
stream, where the diverging river mouths provide a more equal
distribution of tlood waters. With the contribution ot a small-
er river called Thai-binh, the Hong-ba tormed the Tonkinese
delta which spreads on an area ot 10,000 square miles. 6
The Cuu-long is a great river ot Indochin~ and of Asia,
having nearly 2,500 miles 1n length_ Tumultous in Chinese
territories, its course becomes more placid when it enters
Laos. It runs along the northern borders of Laos, goes through
Cambodia' and divides itselt in nine branches (whence its name
Cun-lons, Which means Nine Dragona) in Coehinchlna before com-
ing to the China Sea. In C~bodia, the Cuu-loAg receives the
waters ot Lake Tonle-sap, Which acts as a regulator ot its
tloods. In Cochinc~ina, it torms the most fertile delta of
Indochina, the Cochincblnese delta. It is opportune to note
here that the two deltas ot Indochina are in Viet-nam, whioh
- :i¥:iuz ;
6•. Le-tpanh-Khoi, Le Viet-Bam, Histoire et Civilisation,
pp. 19-20; Masson, OP.clt., p.IO-II
4
7has also a narrow strip of arable land along its coasts.
Over these mountains, rivers and deltas, blow the mon-
soons beoause Indochina is situated in that area of the world
called the ~onsoon Asia". A monsoon is caused by unequal
air pressure over the continent. In winter the dense and
cold air in continental Asia sinks, forming a center ot high
pressure, while the surrounding ooeans have a warmer and les
dense atmosphere. The result, therefore, is that a flowing
ot oold and dry air eomestr~ th.e and to the ooeans. In
summer, conditions are reversed: winds blow .from the oceans
to the lands. According to their prevailing directions,
the winter monsoon is called Northeast Monsoon, and the summer's
Southwest Monsoon. In Indochina, the Northeast Monsoon period
lasts trom ~i~-September to March, While the Southwest Monsoon
prevails during the remainder at the year.S
Under the intluence o~ the monsoon and oecause ot the
terrain, Indochina has varied temperatures. The uplands of
Tonkin, Laos and Annam have below 650 F. In January, the cold-
est month ot the year, While t~e lowlands and deltas have 750F.
During summer, Which oocurs in June and July, the temperatures
are respectively 750F and 850F. In general, Indochina has a
tropioal climate. Warm and wet. The wettest part of Indochina
7. Canadian Government, op.cit., pp.12, 15; Khoi, 2£.
£!!. pp.2l-23
8. Ibid, pp.24-25; Nyugen-van-Huyen, ~ivilis8tion
~aB!mite, pp. 5-6
5is in the southwest, where the moisture-bearing Southwest
Monsoon meets the uplands of the Oambodian coast. The Annam
Cordillera and the mountainous regions of Tonkin and Laos re-
ceive a higher precipitation than other areas. In the North,
the rainy season is summer; in tPe oentral part and the south,
it 1s the autumn. The maximum rainfall in Tonkin 1s 14 inches,
in Annam 31 inches, in Coehinchina 13 inches, in Cambodia 10
inches, in Laos 12 inches.9
These climatic conditions favor the cultivation of rice.
Rice, therefore, is the main production of Indochina. It is
the basic tood tor the Cambodians and Laotians. But it is a
resource ot wealth tor Viet-name In 1937, tor example, the
Vietnamese obtained from their harvests more than 6,000,000
tons at riee. this made Viet-nam the sixth largest producer
and the second largest exporter of rice 1n the world betore
the World War 11. Bat daring the Japanese occupation and
the War of Independence against the French, i.e., trom 1940
to 1954 the agricultural production ot Viet-nam greatly de-
creased. Production ot rice in the year 1952 to 1955 amount-
ed only to 2,633,000 tons. 10
4 ~
9. Canadian Government, oE.oit., pp.l6-l7; Rhoi, op.eit.,pp. 24-35
10. Canadian Government, op.cit., pp.40-4l,45-46; Khoi,
op.cit., pp.4l8-4l9; tnstitute of Pacitic Relations Internal
Secretariat, A Biiet Politioal and Economic Handbook of East-
ern and Southern .•sia, pp.22,24, hereafter CIted as A Brlet~andbook. ~
6The second important crop of Indochina is rubber, and
it is found especially in Viet-name In 1938, rubber pro-
duction of Vietnam was 45,000 metric tons, of which 40% was
exported to the Vnited states.ll
Other orops of Indoohina are pepper, coffee, tea, cotton,
corn,_ potatoes, soybean,etc •••Llvestook do not fOrm an ~por-
tant part of the agricultural econany in Indochina, since
grasslands are rare. Cattle and buftaloes are used as animals
of draught in the fields, seldom for tood. Pigs and fowl tur-
nish the usual meat in the Indochinese diet. But fish takes
the plaoe of meat as a real supplement to rioe in the daily
meals. The tisheries resources, are, therefore, of major im-
portance in Indochina. There are not many full-time fishermen
but nearly eTery peasant is fishi,ng at some time of the year.
Fish are fo~d abundantlY along the coasts of Viet-nam, in the
rivers, and particularly in the l$~e Tonle-sap. 12
The sub-soil ot Indochina is not very rich in minerals.
There are, however, oonsiderable coal reserveS in North Viet-
nam. The estimate given in the Internation 1 Geological Con-
gress held in Toronto, Canada, in 1913, attributed to the re-
serves ot Viet-nam an amount ot about 20,000,000,000 tons.
Here are some figures ot coal production: in 1958 - 2,140,000
11. I.P.R.,A Brief BandbookLP.22. The French historians
used to say that 95% rUbber ot vtet-naJllwas exported to France,
but the addition of the figures ot exportations to France shows
only 30.5%. Jean Cbesneaux,Contribution a ItHistoire de la
N!tion Vietnamlenne, p.~ * ,
l~. Canadian OOvernm.ent,op'."'}O:1t~·;,P'.!;,~~ ••:::: /:.~ ",)
,".. if
...... -
metric tons; in 1948 - 360,000 metric tons; in 1953 - 63,000
metric tons. Beside coal, iron ores. tin, zinc, wolfram, tung-
sten are .Qlinedalso in North Viet.-nam. Central Viet-nam has a
gold mine. 13
Indochina bad a population of about 25 millions in 1940.
Ot this population more than 21 mlllion wer~ Vietnamese, 3
millions Cambodians, and about one billion Laotians. These
tigures are not in proportion with the size ot the respective
territories. Viet-nam has 121,300 square miles, while Cambodia
has 67,900 square miles, and Laos has 94,400 square miles. The
population pf Viet-nas is ~rticularly dense in the North, where
about 1,500 people live in a square mile in the delta. 14
The principal cities ot Indochina are:
Vientiane (1936: 15,000 inhabitants). capital of laOS;
Plplom-P!nh(pop.1948: 110,000), capital .ofCambodia; 8aigo11-
Cholon (pop.1948: 1,669,600). capital ot Viet-nam, two cities
united'into one admin~strative unit since 1931, industrial and
comme.rcial c~nter ot Vlet-nam and or Indochina, major harbor
and. air base; ~, (~oP. 1951: 216,000), capital of Indochina
in the colonial period,tormer capital ot Viet-n~. center ot
land and river communications ot ~onkin; Hai-phong (pop.1951:
14,6,000), ohiet,harbor or North Viet-nam ,and major industrial
center; Hue, (pop. 1956: 43,000), oapital of Annam. 15
, ; c· ,
13. .Canadian ,GovernDlent,IQp ..~;hlt'W,,;-p~~/:?2'~:Y·;>::-·.\': . ~,> '. ~ ,-
....~..r)~,:, ,4/" :tJ';;,
: . f~:~~~~;~anA~::~~~:~~§~~~~t~}~ ?~ ,r~;r·!
~~:.~.' • ,
8When we come to the historical scenes ot Indochina, it
behooves us to proceed caretully. The world knows about Indo-
china through the writings ot the French historians; and the
French his~orians who wrote on Indochina during the colonial
period, i.e., trom 1860 to 1954, could be rightly suspected.
in 1955, a student o:t l1istoryexp'resaed this idea as tollows:
Daring the oolon1al period and 8ti11 since 1945,
the French students who specialized pn the peoples ot
Indochina, on their language,th$ir history, their civil-
isation, were tinanciallly and politically bou~d to the
colonial power. How,then, to expect that they would have
attenti~ely stud1e4 the Vietnamese national reality,
the perman~at.negatlon of'whloh,ln. theory as well as
in praotl.oe:,.was the very co~ltio,n tor the .maintenanceot the l;IamecC)lon1al power? " ,
The author mentioned in particular tbe Vietnamese, because
given the ~portance or Vlet-aam in the indOChinese Union, the
tate ot Viet-~ would have decided the tate ot the other two
oountries, C(iJJlbodiand Laos.
The same author did not hesitate to desoribe the unde-
sirable influence, ot tJ,latcolonial 'bias on the French education
itself. He said:
FroID.the el,ementary school, each one was intormed
ot the artiticial colonial "Indochina''',and otits rive
constitutive eleme,nts:, ~Tonkin", "Anne", "Oochincb.fna",
Laos and C~mbodia. 'l'heyhardly in.dicated to the future
citizens that the tirst .threeot'these "countrtas" spolce
the same langtlsge,belonged to the same natiol1. Theyscarcely insisted Oil the steady resistance whic'h, during-eighty years, thlsp,ople had opposed to the colonial
regime whicll, in other quarters, one presented 8 pure
and stainless. They prUdently aVoided stressing that
'9'
16.. Cheaneaux, op.c!t., p.S
these three "annamese" countries had formed, long be-
tore the Frenoh oonquest, a solid national organism,
the history of whioh was not less ancient than that
ot France. And, of this oountry, ot this nation, the
traditional nameV~!~-Bam itself was striotly banished
trom all our text-books otthe Dt~ary, secondary and
superIor education until 1945. 1?
So, to ,get the rea11 ty behind this "artifioial colonial
Indoehiha", it is necessary to 80 back to the "reality of
Viet-Bam". 18
Tpe historical reality ot Viet-~.
The historical aad racial origin ot the Vietnamese i~
still ebaeur-e , :Patient.researches have shown, however, that
theY' started with a mixture of many elelle.nts,in which the
19brachycephalic type dominated.
What was known is that by the third century B.C. the an-
cestors ot the Vietname,e people had settled on the banks ot
the Red River (Hong-ha). At that tLne, a Chinese general
named Trieu-da. handily carVed an independent kingdom. out ot
these delta lands and certai~provinces of Southern Obina.
But not long.after its organization,.the kingdom of Trieu-da
was swallowed up by the Chinese E,npire in 111 B.C. The Viet-
namese people thus existed under the Chinese rule until the
year ~39 A.D. 20---_ ......_--.".., ------_ .....
1~. Chesneaux,op.eit., p.~
IS. Ibid., p. 12
19 •. Hoang-thue-Tram., Lieh-su Xa-hoi Viet-nam.pp-.39-48
Luong-due-Thiep, Xa-hoi Viet-nam Tien-~Qa-8U, pp.21-29
20. !iff.,ftljl-T'rc;mg~~dlm.;~,Viet-nam stl-luGe pp ,28-29
10.
Under the period ot nearly a thousand years ot foreign
domination, the Vietnamese were sub~ittedto the Chinese civil-
isation. They learned the Chinese language, adopted the Chinese
morality. But, paradoxe of history, they grew at the same time
more and more steady in.their national consciousness. Many re-
volts broke out; some were successful for a time; in many cases
their leaders have become tolk heroes, surrounded by pop~lar
legends. A national holiday is still dedicated to two ot the
earliest ot these heroes. They wer~ two women, the Sisters
Trung. III:r.aot,in 40 A.D .•, these two young ladies indignant
with .the atrooities, of the alien rUlers, raised an army and
drove the Chinese out of the country. When,two years later,
the Chinese troops came back to tind the Vietnamese Volunteer
army dispersed, the Sisters Trung committed suicide rather
than see their territory once again under foreign domination.21
Anothe~ remarkable revolt 4appened in 544. That year, a
nationalist leader n~ed Ly-Bon took over the control of the
country and gained a sixty-year respite tor the Vietnamese. At
., '
tbe beginning ot the ~eventh century, the Chinese succeeded
again in iJnposing their heavy yoke on. the 11ttle natioll. TlUs
t~e, with what seemed mOre hopefulaess than accuracy, the
dhinese_oal~ed the Vie~nam.ese territory Annam, which means
"paQit1e.d south". This tact explains the disgust ot the Viet-
namese for this term, either it is used to designate the whole
- ,
2il. Fhl'li:rpPP'i;Itevj;)l]~~'8J,R1stoire du Viet-nam 19~O-1952p. 13; Th1ep,op.eit., pp.52-3 !hoi, op.cit., pp.loO-102
11.
country or the central portion of it. 22
After the o.ther attempts, a Vietnamese named Ngo-Quyen
raised again the banner of revolt in 939. This General de-
oiselvely deteated the Chinese at the strategic Battle ot
Bach-dang (Sach-dang is the name or a river, tributary or
the ~ed River), and thUG opened a new era or national inde-
23pendenee which lasted tor the next ten centuries.
Of <X>t1rse,the Chinese did not let their prey go without
, ,
resistance. They came back many ttaes, but each time just to
find the Vietnsznese ready to deteat them.. At the end ot the
thirteenth century, Viet-nam faced a terrible thre~t. Atter,
having overrun China with his _ongol hordes, KUb~lal Khan
tried three times to conquer Viet-na~. Three times, however.
the Mongol troops had to retreat, l~aving dead on the battle-
field more than a half ot their soldiers, inclQdin~ the son
of K~o11ai h~self. 24
Dark days c~me again in 1413, wh~n a Chinese army, with
superior forces, swept through the Vietnamese territory to
re-estsblish, their sway. Fortunately, the BeW occupation last-
ed only tive years. Xn 1418, the Vietnamese rallied behind an
fisherman named I.e-Loi, who organized a guerilla army and fOUght
7# ..
12.
sucoesstully to regain treedom. From that time the Chinese
ceased to consider their tiny neighbor in the south as an
easy prey. 25
Not only did the Vietnamese eheOk ~he invasion ot their
to~er rulers, they led also victorious campaigns which help-
ed them to eXpand to the south. This southward march ot the
Vietnamese people had beSUD right atter their settlement in
the Red River ~elt$. When Ngo-~uyen ~e1gned, in the tenth
century, 11is te:rritory already reache'l Boaun-son, a trans-
versal chain ot mountains whioh cut the Central Viet-nam
trom the Annam Cordillera to the coast at the eigh.teenth
p~rallel. On the other side ot the a0a~.son extended the
kingdom of the Chams. For oenturies,the latter were tight-
ins.wi-th the Vietnamese, but they werEttinallY deteated. The
Vietnamese thus advanced, cleared the jungle, pushed baek the
trontier. By l~g8, their terrltory had expanded as tar as to
the sit~ ot Saigon today. 26
By that time, too, a strpggle tor power took plaoe in the
Court ot' th.e_dynasty ot: Le (.deseent$ of Le-Lol). Two strong
tamilies, the Trinh, wb.oatayed in Hanoi, and t~e Nguyen, who
escaped to the South ot Roann-eon tor measureo! security,
opened up an epooh ot c.ivil war. which endured tor a hundred
2'1years.
,- ..
25Khoi, op.cit •• p. 21&-21a,K~, Op.cit •• pp. 19~2~3.
26Khol, oP.clt., Pp.239,2&6-7
27Ibid, pp.242 tt.; K!m, Op.cit., pp.295-304
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Up to the 16th century, the Vietnamese were Buddhists
or Confucianists or even Taoists, or all three together. At
the end ot that century, the Jesuitmiss10naires came. They
were Portug\1ese and Spanish. They JQ,8dem.any conversions
among the Vietn~ese people. In 1662, t~eFreneh m.is~ionartes
followed the Jesuits. They continue4 to convert the peo~le,
but .at a lower rate. Soo~, the activities ot these toreign
priests aroused the snsplclon of the Vietnamese kings. The
faithful and the mis.sionaries,were alike ,ersecuted.28
In 1'784, one of the missionaries. deci(led to procure aid
,
to the. Nguyen tam11y ,'With. tlehope ot tuturEt peaoe to the
Church ot Vle.t-nam.. Bishop Pet.erPlgJ1eau de Behalne, t)le
Bame of the missioJlatoy, went. to .FraIloeand obtained substan-
tial.mater1alsupport.tor thePrinee Nguyen,Anh, then escaP-
ing tha. new insul',gents,..taeTay-son •. 'rhe latter, 1n. fact,
had sQcceeded in taking over south Viet-nam and were advanc-
ing to the north. In 1'786, they became masters ot the whole
of Viet-n~. But their star taded $oon, because Nguyen-Anh,
wi tllthe' help. trolL:the Freneh :Bishop, began the re-conquest
ot ,ower. He recap~ared the cities, one atter another, and
. .. ....
2S. Masson, op.c~t.t pp.43-52. The,Vietnamese people
remained always gratetulforFatber Alexandre de Rhodes, a
Jesuit, who bau invented the rQmanization, of the Vietnamese
language. He wrote m.any boo,kS in.that romanized Vietnamese
characters. He was also. the ,promoter ot. the Societe des
Misp.ions Etr,aAger!s ,de .Paris •. ,See .also nOi, op.c1t., pp.
288-294° Emtr1anualJacques, !'Oppor,tunities iB Viet-mam.-. .
World MisSion,February 1951,pp.2-8;.paan-dinh-Kh1em, Hanh~a2nS Xi-lio1,PP.155-159 ----
14
tinally celebrated his tr1umph over the unified Viet-nam in
1802. At that date, Nguyen-Anh became Emperor Gia-long,
founding the dynasty ot Nguyep, o.t whioh Bao-dai was a
succeS$or to the throne fro~ 1926 to 1945.29
Gia-long treated gratefully the French missionaries,
who enjoyed peace to» a while. But, the French missionaries
undertook a double Job, that ot Christianization and that ot
French propa~anda. Moreover, at that time, the danger ot
western colonization appeared more and more imminent. The
suocessors of Gia-long became, therefore, severe with the
missionaries. Ter~ible persecutions broke again and pro-
voked the indignation ot the French. It was reported that
the first act ot intervention in tavor ot the French miss10n-
aries in Viet-nam was conducted by ~n Amerioan Oommodore in
501845.
Ot course, the attitude of the Viet-Damese kings agaihst
the French missionaries was unwise. It was a time when the
European powers, ~bued witb mercantilism, looked at East
Asia ..with. covetolls eyes. The British .had seized Penang in
1786, Malacca in.1824, Hongkong in 1842, and were fighting
-
29. Khoi,op.cit., pp.295-322; Masson,op.cit.,pp.53-60
The French missionarIes had made an appeal to the French
Government to send Frenc.h ships to Viet-nam to help them in
their missionary work.
30.JQ1I8ph CuenQt, La Salle ...d~s4Marttrs, pp.4-6;Chesneaux,op.cit., p. 95
15
to occupy Burma. Tne Dutch.had obtained the East Indies in
1824 and were longing for Borneo. The Frenoh lagged behind in
the colonial race. In their impatience, any pretext would be
good tor them to earve an empire out ot this part ot the Paci-
tie. And a pretext was given them in the persecutions of the
French missionaries by the .Vie,tnamese kings. BeCSllse among
the missionaries the.r.e.were.s B.UQlber.ofSpanish Dominicans,
they got the Spanish to participate w~th them in their ex-
peditions against Viet_nam.51
In 1658, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly took Da-nang but
could not hold it. He descended to the south, captured
Saigon.,in 1859. In 1862, the. king of Viet-nam was forced to
cede three provinces around th:at city to France. In 1867,
France annexed three more provinoes and established the colony
of Cochincbina. 32
At that time the Freneh were weakened by the Franco-
Prassion war •. They col11d not use toree on a large seale. In-
capable ot controlling tae whole ot Viet-uam by a single act
ot conquest, they invaded it ,iecemeal over the course of
many decades. In 1874, atter neW aggressive activities, they
exacted :from the Vietnamese king the recognition ot tlle French
sovereignty over Cochi~ohina. Fo~ years latef, they made new
""" ... . 4
31 •. Harley Farnsworth MacNair and Donald F. Leah,Modern
Vr Eastern .International Relations, pp...34~35,Al1en t. Hammerhe.Stru68R tor IndochIna, pp.63-6452. 01,op.olt., pp.3~~-374
16
strides in north and central Viet-n$m. In 1884. The Vietnamese
authorities had to sign the Treaty ot Frotectorate with the
French over the remainder ot country. It was at this oonjunc-
ture that the French divided up north and oentral Viet- into
two administrative units, Tonkin aud Annam; Cochinohina having
33been cut ott before.
But. While the King of Viet-nam and his offioials surrend-
ered betore the western aggressive ambition. sustained by a
superior armed toroe. the Vietnamese people was organizing a
tumultous movement ot resistanoe. This movement began early
in 185~. continued uninterrupted until it ended in the tri-
umphant victory ot the Viet-namese ,over the Frenoh at Dien-
bien-phu on lIay 8. 19.54. 34 At tbe first cont~ct with the
French troops. the Vietnamese had sketched a program ot a
long range detense.ot ~heir rights. They had summarized
their indomitable nationalistic feelings in a logical. strong,
but very humane declaration 1n 1862. In that year the ove-
ment ot resistance in Coohichin~ told the French:
All the inhabitants ot the province ot Go-
cong unanimously make this declaration: When we
lose the government ot our king. we are in de-
solation Just like a child Who loses its parents.
'.
• $
33. Chesneaux.op.o1t ••Pp.107-137; Khol,op.cit ••pp.38qtt
-Masson.op.cit •• pp.76-64. Cambodia was oocupied in 1863. About
"the Franoo-,prussion. War,s~e :risher.R.A.L.,A Ristorl ot Euro~e(Boston.HoUghtonMitt~ln C~ ••1939) pp.lQ22-16 5
34. Luoien Bornet,Dien-~1 n-¥hU pp.l.5-15? The wholebook gives a d~oumentar1 aocoun~ 0 tSe triumph ot the Viet-
namese over the Freno~ 1n spring ~954
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Your oountry belongs to the western seas. our
to the seas ot the Orient. As the horse and
buttalo ditter trom one another, so we ditfer
by language,writing and oustoms. Man was
oreated tormerly in distinot ~aoes. Everywhere
he has the same value. but his complexion is
not the same. Gratitude attaches us to our king.
We will revenge his insUlts or we die tor ~.It you persist in bringing h~e to us the sword
and tire, the disorder will ~e tor long, but wewill act acoording to the will or heaven. Q.!£
cause will tinish in~trium~h. It you want peace.gIveiback to our king his erritory. We are
fighting tor this purpose.,. You haTe oocupie
our provinoes to add to the riohes of your empire.
to the lustre of your reputation. Do you want
a ransom in exchahge tor our territory? We will
pay you that, provided that you cease tighting
and bring your troops baek to your concessions.
We will be even gratefUl to you and your glory
will be known in the universe. Do you want a
concession to do business in this oountry? We
consent to it. ut it au refbse we never oease
tighti~ to obel e w 0 eaven. e respeo
your vaue. but we :Pear Heaven more than your
power. We swear to tight eternally and relent-
les81y. When everlthi~ ~ill be wantinf to us.we will take the branc es of the trees 0 make
tlags and sticks to arm our soldiors. How, then,
can you live among us? We ask you attentively to
examine this request and to put an end to a state
ot things untavorable to our interests as well
as to yours.55
Needless to say, tne Frenoh did not pay any attention
to the representations ot the Vietnamese. It the latter
planned to resist, the tormer, on their part, planned to
set up punitive expeditions. The nationalists were partly
killed, ~artly exiled to the Poulo Condores, or to the
tar-away Islands ot Reunion. The rest ot them were in prison.
55.This text
commented
224-225
Go-cong is the name or a provinoe i& South Viet-name
is cited in Chesneaux, op.cit •• pp.108-9; cited and
in Paul.Mus, Viet-nam, 80010l06ie d'~e Guerre,pp.
p •
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Acoording to a writer, who was in a position to know the
question better than anyone else, ·of the six Vietnamese
emperors, since 1884, there were three exiled for opposi-
tion to colonial polioy or tor open rebellion; one abdicat-
ed; one reigned only three years, insufficient time to show
his mettle. The sixth, Bao-dai, eduoated in France, has
done nothing to displease colonial power or policy." 36
Among the many revolts, the most important were that
ot De-tham in 1897, ot Phan-boi-Chau in 1912, of Nguyen-
thai-Hoc in 1930, ot Nguyen-ai-QuQe (Ho-chi-Minh) from
1920 until the defeat of the French. 37
The national plight was not the only conoern of the
intellectual people. Everr unknown peasant, living in re-
motest villages, was hoping tor happier days when the tor-
eigners would leave the oountry. This b~rning aspiration
ot the mass of the Vietnamese people had aa illustration in
the following report of a French missionary in Oochinchina.
In 1902, a missionary, haVing to cross a river of the pro-
vince ot ~opg-~uyen, finally found a light. boat and a villag-
er to oonduct it. On the ~lver, the Vietna~ese peasant seemed
eager to a$k a question. He grew bolder and addressed the
Father: "I know ~hat I may have confidenoe in you and that you
....
36. NgO-dinh-ThUOi ~1et-n~ through Vietnamese Eyes",World Mission,February 95137~ Paul Deveze, ~ ,France d'OutrejMer, pp.94-l04
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would not report to the administrator what I am going to
ask you. Please, frankly tell me how long the French will
stay in this country"? As the Father was wondering, he
added: "You donft want to tell me that, but you should know.
Is it in one or two years that the French woul~ quit?" If
this peasant could venture to ask a Frenebnan such questions,
how much. more earnestly he must have discussed them with his
fellow-oountrymen. And this ~appened in Coch1nchina, the
part ot Viet-na,m which the French had considered as definite-
ly tneirs. 5a
Instead ot recogniting this vit~lity of the Vietnamese
nationalistic. spirit, the trench ordinarily put emphasis on
their accomplished pacification. In 1932, the year When re-
Yolts raged everyw~ere in the whole ot Vietnam, Albert de
pouryourvi11e wrote:
Here is the conquered Al1nam.:here is the
Protectorate, composed of tive countries of the
Union, which estab1isnes tor the Indochinese
peoples ahonLogeneity .in the peace as they have
never known. 39·
The contrary would be correct. The entire colonial
period was a t~e of continuous unrest tor the Vietnamese.
0pen rebellions succeeding to secret plots, they were ~lways
4
38. Mus,op.cit., p.223. The peasants ot Viet-nam during
the colonial perIod not on~y nourished angry tee1ings against
the French but also supported the movement of resistanoe or-
ganized abroad with their scarce money.
39. Pourvourvil1e, op.cit., p. 35
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hunting a propitious occasion to throw out the yoke ot the
40French, because it was really heavy.
The French had tried to make the world believe that its
colonial policy was muniticent. To thsnselv8s, they went on
repea~ing that they bad a "civilizing ission", a "religious
mission", a "cultural mission" in Indochina. In reality, the
amount ot harm they did to the Indochinese outweighted great-
ly the good that they brought. President Franklin D. Roose-
velt had a 'wondertul remark on this matter. In 1945, he
said that the French had been in Indochina "over a hundred
I . •
lears.and have done nothin6 about educatin~ them. that tor
everl dollar thel have put in~ t~l haT! taken out ten". 41
;
The Proportion ot "putt1~ in" and "takiu out" should have
been mo~e than one to ten. A dependable French author had
made the account and said that the expenses France had made
tor the improvement ot Indochina tram 1900 to 1239 were 522
million trancs. -t·., On the point ot view ot "taking out", it
Laurent Arthur 1~ right, the Bank.ot Indochina alone obtain d
trom Indochina a benetit ot 400LOOQ,OOO,OOO trancs a lear.;
One ean _gine how thorough wa t)leFrench exploitation, when
one adds to this tinancial drain, the explatation ot raw
material and labor, a.nd all kinds ot heavy taxes. And one
is inclined to agree with Claude Letort who said that the pop-
40. Bammer,op.cit.,pp.54 tt,
41. Ss.m~~.l. '1... ,Ro.s.e.nmaiiQ. The. ~ubl,=O PaRers and Addresses
ot Z.D.R.,~944-5,p.362
," ~ -',,~.'~,,"'..,~ •• ", .• _ .. ~ ""I' ~ .. "
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ulation ot Indochina "lived on the verge ot starvation" under
4~:,;tlileFrench rule.
The politieal picture was not brighter. A French author,
who was by no means anti-colonial, had proved it. Ne wrote:
There were in 193t a hundred ~nd ten million men
submitted to t~e French sovereignty, but torty-two
m11lion O.f them crowded on the t.erritory ot 5~OtOOOsqu~re kilometers in the,West,ot Europe (France,.
It was ess~ent1alll to th!Jllthat were applied the con-
,tlt,utional laws, therIgnt to vote, lh!-r1Shts ot
man and citizen, the !ndividual libertre!=tmlneItalics). 43 . .
It the Frenchmen only enJoyed the "rights ot man" and
"individual liperti~s", other people in t~e French Empire
were practically .slaves in ser~lce or Fr~nce. But the people
ot Viet-n~who ~ad "fought A thousan4years" against the
Ohinese 4Qmlnation could not be easily redueed to servitude.44
They had resistedaga1nst_the Frenc.h to get back their "rights
ot man" and their "indi~idual liberties". The French retaliat-
ed cruelly. In 19"3, even in the ,midst ot the Japanese occupa-
tion, ..the French 'Governor Gene.ral, V.ice-Admiral Jean Decoux,
had suoceeded to eXl1e o~ to put in jail nearly 10,000 Indo-
chinese. 45
Moreo.ver, tbe French used to think that the move.tnentot
resistance in Viet.nam wss a stepchild ot the French education.
On January 15, 1930, Alexander Vare~. 8$1d: "It was a real
. ..
42t.: C1BJ.xa~: ,I'e:.f.or' " "Les Classes EXplo1 tees",
MOde~nes, ~II, March, 1947, pp. 1080-1081
-43: Deveze, op.clt., p.1l
44. Hammer, op.elt., p.62
45. Deveze, op.cit., p.16l
drama tor France to see the ideas plentitully thrown out by
her spring up and turn against her". To know how plentitully
the French e~ucation in the colonies was, it is enough to re-
ter to the tigures given in 1947 by R. Saller, Governor ot the
Colonies: he showed that while France, with 41,000,000 popula-
tion has 17 universities, her overseas territories wita 50,000,
000 population have none •. Needless to say that the Vietnamese
didn't know French yet when they wrote the declaration ot 1862.
And. when the French gave some e~ucation to the natives, they
did in a way that detied all common sense. In classes ot his-
tory, tor example, the Vietnamese c~ildren ot ten years old
.ere taught t~at "nos ancetressont des Gaulois" (our ancestors
are Gelllcs )46
U~tl1 DOW, aany French contin.ue to Justity their colonial
po1iey in Indoohina. In Februa~y 1947. the tamous French
niter. Francois Mauriac, still exalted French colonialism
in glowing terms. He called it "$ bountitu1 civilization",
a "kind ot orus de". Many wondered Why this Catl101ic, so
olever in other qu.arters, be,came so short-sighted in this
question. Lea Te.tp.psModern!! wrote about him. that "it is
soandalous that a Christian Proves himselt so inoapable to
- ..
'6. Deveze, op.cit., pp.13,19. About the French edu-
cation in Indochina; I need no other authority than myselt,
because I was pne ot the boys who had repeated: nos ancetres
sont des Gaulois.
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desist trom h1mselt and his "ideas". and to retuse to look
at h1ms lt, even tor an instant. with thee.yes at others".
Francois Mauriac. however. was not more Christian than the
French missionaries. and there were no mOre tervent advocates
ot colonialism than they were. The reasons tor this attitud
can be complex. One at them can be in the tact that Francois
Msuriac held 12 sha~esin the Bank ot Indochina, and the pro-
curator ot French Foreign Missions. 102 shares. 47
But. recently. such an expert in the colonial problems
as Albert Sarraut. a tormer Governor General ot Indoohina.
did not hesitate to say:
Colonialism is an interested act ot torce •••
The peoples ~ho look tor'and hold colonies in the
tar-away continents pr~arily think only ot themselves,
work only tor their power. conquer only tor their pro-
tits. ~
In other words, the French coloniali~ in Indochina can
be described as a combination ot economic exploitation. poli-
tical slavery and intellectual oppression. Franklin D. Roose-
velt. speaking ot the French policy in Indochina, said that
-France has milked it tor one hundred yea~s". It would be .ore
acourate to say that Franoe bas st~rved.the Indochinese. In
1944, tor example, to get ready to detend themselves against
47. Les1Temps Modernes, March 1947, XVIII,p.104l
48. Arthur, op.clt., p.50
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an eventual Japanese taking-over of their sovereignty, the
French in north Viet-nam had made a requisition ot rice, which
resulted in the starvation of about 2,000,000 Vietnamese.49
So. when the !tatus quoin 1940, Was referred to the Viet-
H
namaae were not en.thusis$tio about it. Status guo mean.t to
them that they had to live torever uhder the highly u.ndesirable
domination oftha Frenoh. It was not to say,that when the United
S~ates deten~ed tne statuswsuq, it.w~s defending oolonialism.
The foreign polioy of. the Unite~ States, espeoially the Atlantic
Charter and many st8teme~ts of President Roosevelt regarding
Indochina, proved la~gely that the Amerioans were against any
colonial exploitation. But, th~ United States chose the lesser
evil. In 1940, by defending the ,tat~~ guo, it preferred, tor
the t~e being, a peacetul colonialism to the war. And in 1950,
when it decided to help the Frenc4 agai~st the Viet-minh, it
took the courseot saving the ~enoh aims rather than to give
Viet-nam to the commun1sts.50
Moreover, however r liberalthe United States might be, it
cannot solve alone such an 1nternat~onal question as eolonialisa.
It needs the collaboration of other powers in the world, spec-
ifically that of the colonial powers. ~beretore., it took time
to wait for comins eYeJi,ts,in whiC~~~~~ colonial powers would
;p '*
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be roreed to eo-operate with American policy,
With regard to Indochina, history showed that different
steps taken by the United Stat~s during the last fifteen years
were vital to its independence.
1. In 1940-1941, whe~ the Japanese were trying to take
over Indochina, the United states, on one hand did not give
the French any material support to tight against Japan; on the
other hand, it energetically. opposed to the Japanese activities
by representations, by eeono$ic sanctions. The result was that
when the Japanese succeede4 1.11ocoupying 1n4och1na, this occupa-
tion did not a~ount to a ~eal exploitation,because of agreements
previously ooncluded .i~h thf French. '!'heFrench, on their part,
thanks '0 the aora1 and diploma~ie support of theU~ited States,
could keep their sovereignty, but were greatly weakened. And,
the Vietnamese nat~onalists under tAe cover ot Japan oould or-
ganize to a certain extent.
2. From Pearl a8rbor to the Japanese surrender, the United
states always retused to give anY support to General de Gaulle
in his effort to reoeo~py Indochina. T~s way, Japan was able
to put the French in the jail of Indochina on March, 1945, and
to give independence to the natives. The latter had taken pro-
fit of this ocoasion to fortify themselves against an eventual
coming ot the French.
3. Atter the Japanese surrender in 1945, the United States
did not support the French, but neither did it support the Viet-
namese nation.alist.s. As.s consequenee., the Vietnamese Oommunist
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leaders could not take over the country, nor could the French.
After a long war, the French gradually consented to give a
certain degree of independenoe to the Vietnamese, so that the
latter would co-opera~e with them.
4. But the Vietn.am.esepeQple~J1ew that the French were
deceiving them, so they tO$k the side of the Communist leaders
to ti~ht tor tae1r independence. In 1950, the danger that
V1et-nam. Would become a communist country became imminent.
~hen the United Stetas decided_to help the French to tigh,t
against tlleCommunist leaders with the. condit-ion that France
would g~ve real independence to t:ne states of Indochina. Des-
pite the Ame~icanaid the Frenehwere discouraged before the
supreme jttorts of the.Vietn~ese.people. The United States
then put pressure ~n the French, so that they put in pOwer
a non-e~un1st and areal n~tionalist, Ngo-dinh-Diem.
5. In 1954, the French were defeated by ~he Vietnamese
Communists, and were ready to recognize the CO$munists as
masters in Viet~nam, but theU~lted States opposed that move.
Finally, Viet-nam,w8s temporarily cJ1Yld~d by the Geneva Con-
ference on July 1954. From ~hat tl$e.the United States
helped Ngo-dinh~Diem ~o"build up a Fr~e Viet-nam, tree trom
colon1al1s~ and Communi$m.
In the following pages. we ahall stUdy one phase ot this
American polioy. in other wordf;1,we shall see hOW, in 1940, the
United States, While making strong representations against the
Japanese activities in Indoohina, did not eive any material
help to the Fre,nchto fight against Japan.
. The .United Sta tea and Indochina in,l. ,~ " - .." ' ,~ <
The First Indochinese Crisis
The Episode ot
General Georges Catroux
Ju.ne-July 1940
For a long time, Japan had dreamed ot a world empire.
Exalted bl'~he~r nati~~al pride~ contid~nt in th~lr nation-
al toroes, the Japanese planned to carry out their program
ot "Greater Eastern Asia. Co-prosperi ty Sphere", which eu-
phemistically meant the Japanese oOlonial policy. This pro-
gram had been applied to China in 1937 by the inv~sion ot
the northern. Chinese pro.vinees.l As a cQnsequence ot this
aggressive act, the rights ot the American nationals in
China were violated: right ot extraterritoriality, rights
ot residence and trade, rights In special areas, rights to
. 2property, etc. •• Whereupon 'the'United States Government
made its representations and urged Japan to continue the
"open dOOr" policy. 3 The Japanese Govermnent took this
occasion to deti~e their expansionist ideals in the$e terms:
,1. T.g.Bi8S0n,J~an in China,pp.1-39; TatsuQ Kawai,
The Goal ot JaR&nese .RSnsloa,pp.6l-67
2. Wllliam c. Johnstone, !aeUnited States and JaiantsNew Ord6r, pp.23-ll6 ... *
. 3.' ·Shepard Jones q-ndDeIlYs P. M'eyeJ;Os,Documents on
Americ~n Forei~ Relations, January 1938-June !§!9,p.2!'
Hereafter, cit~ as Documents_on AmerieanFore1e,R~lattoe.
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At present Japan, devoting its entire energy to
the establishment of a new order based on genuine
international justice throughout East Asia, is making
rapid strides toward the attainment of this objective.
The successful accomplishment of this purpose is not
only indispensable to the existence of Japan, but also
constitutes the very foundatioa ot the enduring peace
an~ stability of East Asia.
It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Govern-
ment that now, at a time of continuing development ot
new conditions,in East Asia, an.attempt to apply to
present and future conditions without any change con-
oepts and pri~ciples whie~were applioable to oondi-
tions prevailing before the present incident d08S not
in any way ~ontribute to the solution of immediate
issues and further does not in the least promote the
firm establishme!).t ot theellduring peace of East Asia.4
The U~ited States soon sharply realized that "the valid-
ity ot the conception of Japanese ~uthorities ot a 'new con-
dition' and a ,'new ord~rt in-East Asia is highly paradoxical.
The United States Ambassado~ warned that a failure to ob-
serve the,policy ot '"open door" would breed "international
frictions and ill-Will, with oonsequences injurioQs to all
countries, including in particula~ those countries whioh
tail to observe it". At the same time, the United States
eenr eased another
equally tirm oonvietiOn that observanc~ of t~at
pr,inciple .promotes the opelling of trade ohaQaels
th~reby making available the market, the raw
materials and th~ manufactured products ot the
commwaity ot nations ip a mutually reciprocally
beneficial bas1s.5
ben c1ted
tothe
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After this first clash ot views between the two countries
the United States was going to take measures against Jap,an. On
July 26; 1939, the.Secretary or State, Cordell HUll, notified
the Japanese Ambassador in WaShington, Kenzuke Horinouchi,
that the Government ot the United States wished to terminate
in six months, i.e., on January 26, 1940, its commercial
treaty at 1911 with Japan, in accordance with procedures pre-
6seribed by the treaty itselt. But, when Japan undertook the
sou,thward advance over Indochina, in ,1940, the American-Japanese
relations underwentagra4ual bQt serious deterioration, which
was cOnsummated in the tragedyot Pearl Harbor, December 7,1941.
The Japanese encroachments on Indochina had begun two
yearsbet()re. On Jt;1ly7, 19Se, Japan had.made it known to
the French ..Ambassador at Tokyo,. Charles Arsene-Henry, that
tram that date, th~ French ha4 to withdraw trom the Paracels
.' 7Islands and giv& them to Japan. On February 10, 1939, con-
trary to the Franco-Japanese agi:.eementof 1907,8 the Jap-
anese Navy tookoTer the Bainan Island, ott the coasts ot
North Indochina. The Japanese Foreign Oftioe stated in this
oceas.ion that the operation of' the t8panese foroes was "for
. ' -.' i
6. 'Document!-on ~arican FOr$il; R§latlons, 11,2447. ~ontemporary lapan, 4fXI,-I9:B,p.38~; as cited in
Harol¢ S. Quigley, Far Eastern War, 193V-1941, p. 306
a.The Agreement ot 1907 assured the respect of the
integrity or China, the equal treatment of'commerce,etc.,
and wag signed at Paris,June 10,.1907. Ibid., p.307,note 3
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preventing unrest and disturbance in the contiguous regions
and vicinities" ot tbe territories ot Japan, and that the
agreement ot 190? was not violated, beoa~se "sinoe then con-
ditions in China have undergone ,a comVlete change". 9 When
the French Ambassador inquired about the same matter, on
February 13, 1939, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured him
that the ooct1pationot Bal~n does not "exceed military nec-
essity". 10 More than a month later, on March 31, Japan made
another move. It announced its intention to take possession
ot the Spratley Islands and plaoe tham ~der the Jurisdiction
ot the Japanese Goverllor-Genera1ot Taiwan. Under instruction
othis Government,Ambass~dor Arsene-Henry, on April 6, handed
to the Japanese Vice-Minister tor Foreign, Attalrs, a note pro-
testing again,t the Japanese .actiQn. Whereupon the Japanese
otticial. told the French Ambassador that
there is no room tor conside~ation regarding the
issue, Which was decided on the basis ot establish-
ed policy, and that the Japanese Government would
receive the note only a& a matter~ot reterence. 11
Also, in 1939 the Japanese had compelled the French Gov-
er,or.'iGeneralot Indochina to pr.ohibit transportation ot arms
and ammunitions into Chiaa through the railroad Ha~phong-Yunnan;
and had bombed this railroad in the.Ch1Aes~ t~rritory. 12 This
--------_. -----------"-,
"9'. QUigley, op.cit., p. 307.
10. Statement oithe Japanese Foreign Ottice,Feb.I0 1939
Co.ntemporery Japan, VIII,1939,p •.182,as, cited in Q.1ngle••~1d4:.i.,pp. 307-3Q8
11. Statementot.the Japanese Foreign Ottiee.Feb.15,l959
loe.oit.It is not correct to say that the French Government
did RQt protest, Chesneaux,op.clt., p.224
12. "French Indochina", the New International Yearbook1940, p. 291·
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began to involve the United States in the Indochinese question
because the merchandises transported through the Haiphong-
Yunnan railroad were mostly ot American origin, and those who
did business there were mostly American citizens.
At the beginning ot 1940, the Amerioan Embassy ot Tokyo
notitied the Japanese Foreign Otfioe a ~ro-mem£!1! that readq: .
The United states GoVernment is intormed that
the portion of the railway between Eaiphong and Yunnantu
which lies in Chinese territory has recently been sub-
jected to trequent bombings by Japanese military air-
planes. This railway in recent months has oarried a
considerable part of the trade involved in the normal
commercial relations ot the United States and China.
American oammerce must, theretore, neoessarily be in-
jured an~ the lives of American oitizens engaged in
.that commerce may be endangered as a result of the
Japanese bombings of that railway •••••
The United States will b8ve no other choiee, if
the bombing continues, than to add this to the ex-
tensive list of injuries commercial and otherwise
which has been suttered by it as a result of the ac-
tions of the 3apanese forces in China ••••••••
The American note added tha,t the Haiphong-YulUlan rail-
road was "an important means ot ingress and egress" to the
personnel of American ofticial establls.bments at ChQngking.
Therefore, the Japanese bombing of it would have more ser-
ious consequences.13
In their re91y, the Japanese authorities established
the lawfulness ot their actions, invoking the Franco-Chinese
agreement ot 1903 which applied to the laying ot the Haiphong-
Yunnan railroad, and said that the railroad W&s exoluded trom
any cla~ to neutrality. They oontinued:
-------,-----
13. Foreign Relations of the United States,Japan, 1,674
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At the present time, the Chiang regime is ·em-
ploying the railway as an important route for the
s~pply of arms, ammanition and other military com-
modities, and therefore, the Imperial forces may
properly take suob military measures against the
railway as t4ey teem necessary.
With regard to the injury to American trading rights
and to the danger to the lives of citizens, the note ex-
pressed the regret of the Japanese Government, but stated
also tMt Japan could not cea~e bombing the Haiphong-Yunnan
railroad. fhe text said:
As a part of the military operatio~s whioh are de-
veloping on a large scale in China, the Imperial forces
are takiag poper military measures against the trans-
portatien of military supplies over Hanoi-Yunnan rail-
way; oonsequently, although it is regretted that the
lives ot the Amerioan nationals and Amerioan oommeroe
are eXP9sed to danger, the circumstances are UDavoidable.In view ot the legal positIon above stated, it is believ-
ed that the American Goveronent will appreciate the view
ot the Japanese Government; that the question ot assump-
tion ot responsibility by the latter Government does
not arise. 14
Th~ United States rejected flatly the Japanese view. On
M~rch 11, 1940, in an answer to the Japanese note, the Amer-
ican Am~assador, Joseph C. Grew, made it clear that the United
States Government did not admit "the relevancr to the question
unde~ consideration of: the reference made by the Japanese For-
.ignOtti~e,to the Chinese-Fr~neh Railway Construotion Agree-
ment ot 190a" nor did it appreCiate th$ view of the Japanese
Governmentresarding the "lack of responsibility on the part
of the Japanese GovernMent tor any ~oss ot Amer!can life, or
- i¥ ..14. Forei~ Relations. of the United State_~ Japan,I,pp6"-~. .. . '
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damage to American property" sUbsequent to current bombings
of the railway by the Japanesemilitarcy airplanes. 15
As for Indochina itself, in the middle of 1940, the
situation was _ope1ess. On one hand it could not expect
any help trom Franoe, Which was succumbing to Nazi inva-
sion. 16 On the other hand, it was already half-encircled
by the Japanese. The latter we~e established in the Sprat-
ley Islands, in_the Parcels !slanda,in Hainan Island. More
dangerous still, the J~panege Army at Canton had reached the
Northern herders ot Indochina, in the other side ot Lang-SOB;
and three other Jap~nese bata1lions were operating in the
Chinese Provinee ot Kwan~si, beyond the fronti~rs of Laakay.17
And, when the french authorities surveyed their military forces
they found that, in ~11 In40china there were about 60,000 men
in the Army, and practically no Navy. They had no modern air-
planes and their strategy was that Of the year 1901.18
The Japanese, on their part, did not make a secret of
their designs on Indochina. .Repeated1y, theY ~enaced the
French authorities ~ith the threat of an armed invasion it
the carrying ot supplies ~y way ot the Indochinese railroad
. .
15. Foreign Relat~ons_C)f the Unlted.sta1ieSdJapan,~.678
16. See, ,for example, wIlliam L. Linger an S.Everett
Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1931-1940, pp.454-458
17. Jea~ DeeoQx,A la Barre de l'Indoehine, Histoire de
mon Gouvernement General, 1940-1945 pp.16-77Ie. Ibid., pp. 79-80, 85-86
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into China did not stop at once. General Georges Oatroux
summarized ~he attitude ot t~e Japanese military authorities
toward Indochina as follows:
The Commander ot the Japanese Army in KWeichow,
Province of China (directly North et Indochina) was
constantly threatening and criticizing IndoChina tor
"assisting" China by permitting the transport of
materials across Indochina into Ohinese territory.
The Japanese Army radio constantly Broadcast these
protests and demands - the Japanese were particularly
angry regarding the transport ot gasoline to Kumming
under the Ohinese-American agreement.
Being aware of the weakness of IndoChina, General Catroux
stopped the transit ot gasoline on June 16, 1940, in an etfort
to appease t~e Japanese. 19
But this preventive measure on the part of the French
Governor General came too late. Cataclysmic. events had pre-
ceded him in Europe, Which gave the Japanese 8 golden oppor-
tunity to satisty their ambitions in r~gard to Indochina.
In fact, on. June 16, While German troops were pouring
toward Paris, Italy ieclared war against France. The tall
of France appeared certain.·20
Four Four days later, i.e., whe.n in Indochina, General Catroux
made 'his concession to the. Japanese threat, the French Oabinet
which bad moved to Bordeaux voted 13 to 11 tor an armistice.
On tbatftdecisive date in FrenCh historyft, the President of
France, Albert Lebrun, asked Marshall Henry Philippe Petain
... ..... t ~)
.. 19. Statement of General Catroux, on Aug.l, 1945; the
General was, then, Ambassador of .France to USSR, in Moscow.New York Times, August 2, 1940
.20. HamIlton Fish Arms,trong, QhroB2lo& of Failure,
Th~ Last Dals ot_theF:~ch Repub!!£, p.77 .
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to torm a government. That same night, Marshall Petain sent
tor the Spanish Ambassador and asked Madrid to communicate to
Chancelor Adolf Bitler the French Government's request tor an
armistice. 21
The next day, the fighting still continued on the soil of
France. But in the evening, the world had heard already the
mourning of Sir Winston Churchill, Pr~e Minister of Great
Britain:
The news from France is very bad, and I grieve for
the gallant French People w~o have fallen into ~his ter-
rible .isfortune. Nothing will alter our feelings to-
ward them, or our faith that the genius of France will
rise again. vVhat has happened in France ma~es no diff-
erence to British faith and purpose. We have become
the sale champions now in arms to defend the world cause.
We shall do our best to be worthy of that high honor.
We shall defend our island, ~nd with the British Empire
around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the
curse of Hitler is lifted from the brow ot men. We
are sure tnat in the end all will be well. 22
On June 16. 1940, while all FrenCh cities and towns of
more than 20,000 population are for practical purposes sur-
rendered to the German$ by an ofticial proclamation declaring
them to be "open cities", General Charles de Gaulle, with a
tailing voice, appealed fr~ London to the ~eople of France
not to cease resisting the invaders. He said:
The Genera~s who tor many years have commanded the
French armies have formed.a Government. That Government,
alleging that our armies have beeh defeated. have opened
negotiations with the enemy to put an end to the fighting.
wi: +ics ---
21. Arm.strong, op.cit" ·PP.95,10222. Ibid., p. 106 .
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We certainly have been, and still are, submerged by the
mechanical strength of the enemy, both on land and in the
air. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans
far more than their numbers were responsible for our re-
tirement. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the
Germans astnunded our generals to such an extent that
they have been brought to the pass which they are in
today. But has the last word been said? Has all hope
disappeared? Is the defeat f1nal? No.· Believe me, t
speak with knowledge and I tell you that France is not
lost. The same methods which have brought about our de-
feat can quite well one day bring viotory. For Franoe
is not alone. She is Dot alone - she is ~ot alone. She.ha'sa vast empire behind her. She, can unite with the
British Empire, which holds the seas and is continuing
the struggle. She can utilize to the tull, as England
is doing, the vast industrial resources of the UnitedStates •••••23
These developments, directly and indirectly, confessed
aloud not only the weakaeas but real helplessness of Franee.
General De Gau~le boasted or the Frenc~ vast empire and count-
ed on it to build up the resistance.lIlovement. But the Japanese
who had given refuge to the V~etn~ese nationalists for half
a century, 24 knew well that the French Empire was sustained
only by the French armed forces, and these forces were actual-
ly wanting.. The United States remained the hope or France,
and the obstacle te Ja~anese ambition, but was the UAited
States willing and ready to ti~t tor the Fre~ch in Indochina?
All these facts concurred to show to Japan's leaders that the
door was swinging wide open to them to ~pose their political
will on Southeast Asia.
p *
23. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 110
24. Devillers, Qp.cit., p. 36
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In reality. Japan did not miss its cbanoe. On June 19,
1940 when the Frenoh Government was reoeiving the Ger~an re-
ply to Petain's request for an armistice, and while the people
ot France were waiting for the hwniliating oonditions which
would come from the Nazi Chanoelor,25 the French Ambassador
in Tokyo was invited by the Japanese Vioe-Ministe~ tor Foreign
Atfairs, Masay~ki Tani, to the Foreign Office for an interview.
What Japan had to otfer to France then, was a "strong represent-
ation" regarding French Indochina. But. as it was revealed
later, by "strong representation" the Japanese meant a real
ulttmatwn; it was resolved, ~~ the part ot Japan, that it
26the French refused, tOTce would be used. In tact, during
those days, it was reported that the Japanese Navy performed
unusual activ:lt1-es in· the South, Seas.2'1 Here are the main
points ot th~t representation:
1. The French Government is called u.pon to issue
an order prohibiting exports ot materials to the Chung-
king Government trom Indoehina;
2. The tollowingmeasures should be adopted to
enable an idea to be tormed as to the measure of strict-
ness with which the proposet order is carried out;
a~ Statistics of gasoli~ettrucks.and railway equip-ment held in Indochina should be compiled for presenta-
tion to Japanese ofticials;
b. It necessary, statt members ot the Japanese
consulate in Indoohina should be allowed to inspect
materials ,in the,presenee of French officials;
c. Japanese officials should be allowed to station
tbemselves at ~noi and points along the Chinese border
to see that speoified materials are not e~ported to
China trom Indoohina;
25. Armstrong,~.cit •• p. 102
26. "Kido Diary, entry for Ju.ne 1'1, 1940; as eited in
He~bert Feis, !he RoaAto Fearl.Harb~rJ the pomin5 of War Be-
tween the United. States and Ja!!n. p. 66
2'1. Decoux, op.clt., p.66~
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d. French authorities are to close the Chinese
border if these measures fail to ensure strict enforce-
ment of the proposed embargo on exports of materials to
the Chungking Government. 28
Immediately. Arsene-Henry transmitted these points to
his Government and to General Catroux. The French Ambassador
4id not forget to advise the French Governor General that a
conciliatory attitude would be desirable in view of the cir-
29cumstances. General Catronx realized this. and on that
same night, without consulting the French Government at
Vichy announced his acceptance of the Japanese proposals to
Arsene-Henry. 3Q
On the following day. June 20. 1940. the Toklo Gaze~
made pUblic the result of the Japanese diplomacy on the Indo-
chinese question in these terms:
The French Ambassador called on the Vice-Minister
at 3:50 o'clock this atternoon and stated that the
Frencb GoVernment have since the 17th of tbis month
forbidden the transportation of such oommodities as
gasoline and trucks to China. but that in view ot the
repeated representation of the Japanese Government they
have decideQ to prohibit the transportation of materials
and goods of an extremely Wide range of varieties and
that they have no objection to Japan's dispatching in-
spectors to the spot. This interview ended at 3:45
o'clock this afternoon. 51
or course the conduot ot General Catroux was hazardous.
And he was blamed severely by his Government. Bu.the could
not do otherwise. Refusal to the Japanese demands would have
entailed the loss ot Indochina. because as already noted.
28.
29.
JaI!.on,p.
30.
31.
Document on American Forei~ !elations.II,p.27lAndre Ga~del, L'Indochine rancaise en Face du
70 . - - -- -
Decoux. oR.oit •• p.66
Documents on Merican Foreign Relations,II,p.272
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Japanese forces 'were ready to invade it. Fnrthermore, in
the mind.Gt the,French Governor General, his concession had
the purpose of buying t~e, while he was waiting tor help
from the United States.
In taet, atter having stopped the transit of gasoline
through I~dochina into China, General Catronx was axious to
know the attitude ot the United states it the Japanese at.
tacked Indochina. On June 18, 1940, he asked the French Am-
bassador in Washington to take up the matter with the State
Department. ,The next day, he asked again the French Ambass.
adar, in Washington to requ.est the,State Department tor per-
misslonto ship 120 airoraft and anti-aircraft guns to Indo-
china for the purpose ot "maintaining the status.guo in the
Pacific tt • Unfortunately, here are theresul.ts Of his demarches.
Catroux said:
On June 20, the Freneh Ambassador in Waahington
transmitted to ~e the reply ot the under-secretary of
State: "The United States Govermnent did not believe
that it could enter into confliot with Japan and that,
furthermore, it would take no action it Japan attackedIndochina".
The French .Ambassador in Washington observed that
in the Circumstances, the only oourse open was to close
the Chinese tronti.r. To this the Under-secretary of
State remarked: "I will not answer otficially but that1s what I would do in your place." 32
With reference to the request tor the permit to purChase
arms lathe United states, the Under-secretary ot State, Sumner
Welles, told the rrenoh Ambassador that the application .would
32. New York Times, August 2, 1945, p. 7
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be welcomed like that ot any friendly government". But.
"nothing came trom the request". concluded General Catroux.
The United States Pad declined also an invitation of
the French and British Governm~nts otficiously to attend
their con!erencebeld at Singapore from June 22 to June 27.
1940. for the purpose of a joint defense in the Far Eastern
33area.
The discouragement in rE;'gardto help from the United
States was voiced also in the telegraa which Admiral Jean
Darlan, Minister of the Navy and Merchant Marine ~f the
French Government. sent on June 24. Ig.O, to Vice-Admiral
Deco~x, then Commander ot the French Navy in the Far East.
In this telegram it was revealed that there was "little
local support to be expected from the United states". and
that there was "no effective help to be expected trom the
United States in the near tuture". 34 This was another
proot that 'General Catroux had taken the right course when
he made concessions to Japan.35
But was the United States inditfer~nt to the interests
of Prance and ot Great Britain in the Pacific area? To
understand the solicitude ot the American Government regard-
I ; ¥
33. Deeoux.op.cit •• p.22
34. Ibid., p. 34
35. General Catroux said that his appeal to the British
tor assistance wa$ also unheeded. According to the message
Lord Halitax,British Secretary ot State for Foreign Affairs,
sent on June 10. to General Catroux. in answer to the latter's
request. Indochina had no hope tor effective military aid from
Great Britain. General Cat1'"Ouxwas told the same thing,on June
29, by Sir Percy Noble, British Commander in Chief or ~e
China Station. Ibid., pp.43,49
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ing the situation i,nEast Asia, it is enough to glance at
this passage of Cordell HUll's Mem0!rs:
As I surveyed the chaos in Europe and tried to
calculate the dangers that threatened us trom that
quarter, I could never for an instant relax the at.
tention I had concentrated on the Far East. In ad-dresses an4 statements in previous years, I had point-ed out again and.again the interrelation of the vari-ousareas of the world emphsizing that war in one wascertain to have disruptive effects in all ot,hers; but
never had this fact become so evident as BOW. 36
To his own efforts, the Secretary of State added those
of his political advisors, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Maxwell M.
Hamilton, and Joseph W. Ballantille, thre~ ranking Far Eastern
experts. He told them:
I can't think of anything we have overlooked in try-
ing to arrive at working relations With Japan. But I
want you to take a fine-tooth CQmb and a microscope and
go back over our relations With Japan and see if it is
humanly possible to find something additiomal with which
to approach them and prevail upon them not to gallop
ott on a,wild horse. 3?
He tel t really relieved when in accord wi t,hthe.tn,he
d14 find a sol~t1an to the problem ot the Far East. To quote
him:
We did make one special propoeal, relating to the
Pacitic Ocean possessions of the European belligerents.
I cabled Grew OR June 22 to propOSe a tormal exchange
ot notes with Japanguarantee1ng the status guo of
such. possessions. I further proposeQ. that our two
Governme~ts sho~d oonsult should any question arise
concerning the §tatus guo of theQ~, territories. 36
Secretary of State Hull did not expect that Japan would
be willing to bind itselt in this exchange ot note he proposed.
36.
3?
38·.
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But he tried what he could do. On his part, the American
Ambassador at Tokyo noted as follows the result of his
activities during June, 1940, in executing the directives
of the State Department:
My private conversations with Arita (Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs) on JUne 10,19,24, and
28 have led to no concrete results, but they have at
least served to keep the door open between our two
Governments, which was their primary purpose. 39
So, it is evident that the United States kept a watoh-
ful eye over the situation ot the Far East and was not in-
different to the plight ot the Europeans possessions in
this area, as far as the peace ot the world waa concerned.
It seems opportune to cite here the logical explanatio~
given by Werner Levt, author of perican-Australian Rela1iions
on the reason why the United States worried about the Japan-
ese int.ention to move Soqthwarcl. Lev! wrote:
This thre.t to Southeastern Asiaw8s a threat to
lite lineS.ot the British Empire and to Vital raw mat-
erials needed tor the survival ot Great Britain, Which
the United States considered vital tor its own satety.Anything endangeringtbe existence ot Great Britain
was theretore considered as indirectly endang$ring the
United States. Consequently, Japants southward move im-
mediately provoked a stitter attitude on the part ot
the United States and the planning ot .easures to pre-
vent the re~lizatlons ot Japan's intention. 40
Theretore, When Japan menaced Indochina, the United states
,. -- - ...
39. Joseph C. Grew, !On Years in Jaesn,A Contemporary
Record Drawn trom Diaries.and PrIvate and Official Papers of
JOseph C. Grew, Onlt~d States Ambassador to Japan,l932-1942
p. 321
40. Werner LeVi, !merican-Australian Relations, p.l46
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was alerted. Indoohina was in tact an,important strategie spot.
It was a rice bowl which could teed the Japanese troops for a
long time. It possessed many strategic raw materials such as,
coal, tin, wolfram, rubber, Which could help the Japanese to
prolong their fight. More important still, Inq.oohina was the
gate-way to Thailand ant Malaya. It cou~d serve as a spring-
board for the Japanese to jump to Singapore, to the Netherlands
East In~l1es, and eventUally to the Philippine Islands which
the United States was bound to defelJ,d. Besides that, the United
States also had direct commercial inte~ests in Indochina. In
June 1940, there were about 125,000 tons of goods, mostly com.
ing from the United States, accumUlated on the docks at Haiphong,
ot which about 10,000 tons were being transported into China
through the Haiphong-Yunnan railroad.41
But, at the height of the American concern, on June 17
or 18, the Japanese Director of Military Intelligence told
the British Military Attache' lh Tokyo that the Japanese people
would be cowardly it they tailed to take advantage of the dis-
asters suftered by France and Great Britain in Europe to seize
French IndOChina,. the Netherlands East Indies and Hong-kong.
At the same time, the American intelligence service were re-
ceiving reports which suggested the possibility of a Japanese
42raid on Hawaii.
The United States, however, When it looked at the Pacific,
41. Langer, l!eChallenS!, p. 597
42. Ibid., p. 595-6 .
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did not have the same ambitions as France and Great Britain.
Its plan, therefore, was different from theirs. As in the
case of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, an~the Open Door at the
turn of the oentury, the policy of the United States in the
second World War was imbued with more liberality and justice
than that of the European nations. Regarding the situation
in the Pacific the United States was trying ~ot only to avoid
war, but also to avoid colonialism, whereas France, for exam-
ple was trying to aVoid war only to save colonialism. This
differenee of aims resulted in a difference in tactics.
Coming back to General Catrou.x, we see that he was help ...
less betore the Japanese ult~at~. But When he had made nec-
essary concessions to Japan, many protests arose. The Chinese
Gover~ent at Chungking announced, on June 23, its indignant
feelings, stating that therelationshlps between China and
Indochina were not only intimate in nature but also sanctioned
by several conventions, the most recent of which, signed on
May 16, 1940, agreed ftto the transportation through In400hina
of all kinde of merchan4iae inolu.ding arma and ammWlitlon".
So, France should live. up to her obligations and keep the Indo-
chinese route open. It France yieldeQ, to the Japanese demands,
the Chinese Government could view it with but the gravest con-
cern. And the. Chinese Foreign Minister ended ~is statement
with a menaCe:
Therefore, in the case of armed Japanese invasion
45
of Indochina, the Chinese Government, in order to pre-
serve Chinats existence and independence, will be con-
strained to take. such measures in self defense as may
be deemed necessary to cope witb the situation in pur-
SQance of its fixed policy of resistance against ag-
gression. i3
The protests of the French Government itself against
the oonduct of General Catroux was still more threatening
to him.
General Catrouxbad accepted tne Japanese demands without
consulting the French authorities. Given the actual chaos ot
the Fl:'enehGovernment t-raJ]l which he received no communication
tor tour 4ays, 44 and beca~se ot the emergency of the Japanese
ultimatum, the lrreneh Qavernor General thought that ae couJ,d
aet by his own 4isc1"etion. But when he infar~ed the French
Minister ot France Overseas at Bordeaux on June 20, 1940,
instead of approval, he received a grave. reprimand. 45 Feel-
ing that he was misun4,erstoG4, (Jeneral Catrolix presented his
able detense to the Government of Marshall Petain as tollows:
I think that you Would appreciate more exactly
the r~a11ty of the tbr~at which Japan makes on 1~do-china, by Considering the tact that one part ot its
Navy is directed toward the C08$t ot Tonkin. This
event will help you '\;0 understand tbe better,the de-
cay wkith which the capitulation of France has affected
her in Asia, and to see that there is no more time for
us to sta~d fir~ again$t Japan.
Whe.Ilone is bea,ten, when one has no airplanes and
anti-aircraft guns, no submarines, one tries to keep
one's property wit~out having to tight, or one negotiates.
Tha tis. what I have done •
.. j.
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You tell me that I should have consulted you •••
I answer that I am at a distance ot 4,000 miles from
you, that you can do nothing for me, and lastly, that
I would have been bound to a delay.
I have taken my responsibilities. I will do it
again •••••46
This strong language ot Ge~eral Oatroux resulted in the
loss ot his position in Indochina. On June 26, 1940, the
French Gover~ent decided to recall h~ and named Vice-
Admiral Decouxto his place. T~e tormal announcement of
this change was made tour days later. 4'1
But at thist1me ot trouble, ot shame, and ot indeci-
sion in the situation ot the ~other-eountry", obedience
proved to be a rough te~t tor General Catroux. He was much
opposed to the Freneh request ot an armistice and was strong-
ly i1'lcline4to continue the war from the Empire in accordance
w,"th tile appeal ot General de GaUlle. On June 26, the day
atter the armistice was a~ounced, Catroux said in a tel~gram
to Viee-Acimiral Decoux, th.at "I retuse to recognize an armi-
48stice or armltic8.$,and.! will not execute the conditions thereof".
But being cautious, he did not plan to do anything which
could give the JapaAese a reason tor exploitation. On June 29,
when the Japanese transit con~rol commission arrived at Hanoi,
-----_._- ....----_..._-
46. M.Gsl'cen, La Fracas au Ma..rach~lPetaill.Compte Rendn
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47. Decoux, op.cit., p.55
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he transnitted to the French Resident SuperiQr of Annam
this message:
For your personal information, I previously
stated tbat w~en I shal receive my revocation, •••
I will not proclaim the dissidence of Indochina.
For such an act would be, as I know it, considered
and exploited by the Japanese as a modification ot
the status guo in the Pacitic. 49
And it w~~ in this spirit that he met the Japanese
authorities the next day.
But, the Japanese, who tailed to take over Indochina
by the ulttmatum of June 19, 1940, thanks to the concilia-
tory attitude ot General Oatroux, telt themselves "eowardly"50
and tried again on June 29. With the Japanese transit control
commission, there also arrived Japanese warships, a dredging-
machine and a torpedo-boat, Which took up stations in the
harbor ot Hai-phong, While another Imperial Navy unit was
stationed at Rainan Island. 51 SimUltaneously, Japanese
troops were concentrated in ~wangslProvince, on the IndO-
chinese border.52 Meantime, the oontrol commission attempt-
ed to provoke reaction from the French authorities, by behav-
ing themselves as in a conquered country. Any incident be-
tween the representatives of the two co~ntries would be a
good pretext tor an immediate Japanese military occupation
.,
49. Decoux,oPicit., p.3'1
50. See the s a emEtnt ot the Ja.panese Director ot the
military intelligence service,mentioned in page 42,th!s paper.
51. Decoux, op.clt., ,.70
52. The New International Yearbook.1940,p.291
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ot Indochina.
For a second t~e,however, the Japanese had to bold back
their machinations, because ot diplomatic pressure trom Wash-
ington and even from Berli~, and directly because ot Oatroux's
own machinations.
We have noted that Oatroux's request tor help trom the
United States was turned down by the Under-Secretary of state,
because, at that time, quite apart trom the tact that the War
and Navy Departments did not have units that could be sent to
Indochina, the American Administration was determined to avoid
any complioation in tbe Pacitic area if "humanly possible."54
But trom June 21, 1940, the United States Government was
delQged with pleas to take a strong stand on Indochina. That
day, in a telegram,58niang-Kai-Shek oalled the President's at-
tention to the serious situatioa ot Indochina. Consul Reed
at Hanoi had also a word to say about the same question.55 On
June 27, the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, accompanied by
the Australian Minister, Richard G. Oasey, asked the Secretary
ot State to decide whether Japan should be opposed or appeased;
they reminded him that, in the latter case, ~rench Indochina
might be ocoQpied at any moment". and the security not only or
the British Empire but that ot the United States as'well would
be ~periled. On'the tollowing day, Secretary Hull made clear
the
53. Deeoux,op.olt., p.68
54. HUll,Q2.o1t ••1,a88; see also page 38 of this paper
55. Tel. from~eed (Hanoi) June 21,1940,eited in Langer,Ohallenge, p.599
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his view, saying that:
neither should we make ooncessieDs so sweeping that
Japan would aecept them as a basis for agreement and
tllep.bide her tim.e to make further demands or take
further steps, nor should we embark upon military or
eoonomic action5~o drastic as to provoke immediatewar with Japan •.'1
Whereupon, Rulldecided to leave the American Fleet at
Hawaii, hoping that this was sufficient tQ deter the JapaneS7
from a flagrant aggression against Indochina. 58
These talks and actions were still like the beating of
distant drums. so tar as the Japanese were ooncerned and, as
Ambassador Grew remarked they pretended not to hear. 59 But
the records show that: "The Japanese Navy. remained wary about
a long war with the United States - 8 war tbat would be begun
with only l1mited reserve or 011.60
At the same time, negotiat1p.t:lsconducted in Berlin by the
Japanese Ambassador, Saburo Kuruau, with the purpose ot getting
Nazi favor, were not encouraging to Japan. Ambassador Kurusu
pointed out that Japan had a marked interest in French Indo-
china and asked Germany to let it have a tree hand in that
territo~7. 61 But, trom Tokyo, the German Ambassador, Engen
Ott, sent to the.Nazi Fo~eign Minister,Joaohim von Ribbentrop,
the wise advice that Indochina be used as a bargaining item to
57.
58.
59.
60.
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Japan in the Axis sphere. 62
But the main factor in frustrating the Japanese plan
ot a military invasion of Indochina at the beginning of
July, 1940, was Catroux's prudent policy, a policy designed
"to temporize and hold em, wai tins tor a more 1'avQrable turn
to the war". 63
In tact, on June 30, 1940, General Catroux staged a show
01'political skill in manipulating a double enemy. On one hand,
he m~naged to drive Vice-Admiral Decoux out of the Government
General of Indochina, on the other, he tried to divert the
Japanese trom their territorial ambition. Both aims succeeded
tor the moment.
That same day, when the nomination of Jean Decoux to the
Government General of Indochina was declared officiallY,Decoux
transmitted to the French Government a telegram which begins:
~n comr!ete aecord with Gfneral Oatroux~ and basinson man~ gual:!led advlcss rltal~cs mIner; I e$tImate it
dangerous In every aspect ~ediately to replace the
Governor General in actual circumstances •••••64
Then, General Catroux availed himself or this delay to
secure his position vis-a-vis the Japanese. ~d the latter-
consented to respect the French sovereignty on Indochina, he
would have thrown otf altogether the authority of Mannall
62.Loa.cit.
53.The New Y9rk Times,August 2,1945,recording the state-
ment of General eatroux on the situation of Indochina on June-
J~ly,1940
64.Deeoux,op.cit., p.56
51.
Petain. Though the Japanese soon proved to be too ambitioQs
tor his ability of concession and he had to stop, his atti-
tude at the start of the negotiation with the Japanese head
of the transit control commission, General Isaku Nishihara,
had saved Indochina trom an ~ediate danger,C~troux said:
I gave the JapaJl~se Arm.y no pretext for intervention,
insisted on mutua+ respect tor the transit agreement,
and refused encroachment on the sovereign rights of France.
In order to divert Japanese attention trom their
territorial aims, I pressed them toward economic under- 65standing so that it oould be advantageous to both countries.
GeneralCatroux was very positive in the last point. He
presented to the Ja~anese a memorandum ot present and future
foreign trade of Indochina in which he described the downward
tren~ot exports to France si~ce aut~ 1939 of s~ch staple
products as rice,~nions,coa1. In conclusion, he went ahead
of the Japanese demands and said:
Accordt.ngty, it is a matter CJt urgent necessity for
French Indochina to seek an outlet for her exports other
than France, espeoially in the countries of the Pacific.
Regarding stapleprodl,tcts,fortanate1y Sapan has replaced
Franoe as a large buyer of agricultural products, and it
might be well said that Japan has saved French Indochina
trom an economic c~isis. America,too,has inere~sed herpurchase of F~ench Indochina rUbber since the outbreak
at the Europaan war, but there is a limit to the export
of other goods to the United States; Japan isa good cus-
tomer of coal,1ron,ore.salt,etc •••,and there is a great
prospect ot increasing eXPorts ot rabber,tin and rockphosphate to Japan, while French Indochina can bUy Jap-
anese cotton yarn, cotton text1les,rayon,porcelain wares,
a,nd chemical prod~ets.6'
65. The Ney!Y2rk Times, August 2, 1945
66. ~oeumen~s on Amer!canFore!&e Relations,III,274
52
About this, Vice-Admiral Decoux remarked that the quasi-daily
conversations between the two generals took soon a much more
political than technical interest, so that "no one still thought
of listing the goods, the transport of which into China would
67be hence prohibited".
Secondly, General Catroux also declared he turned down
"an otfer by the Japanese General Nishihara tor a ipanese Al-
liance", and refused to "recommend such an alliance to the
Petain Government". 68 However, it he did not conclude any
alliance with Japan, he did make tar-reaohing concessions. On
July 2, 1940, the Japanese controllers were allowed to station
themselves in six points in Indochinese territory, namely,Mon-cay,
Lang-son, Cao-bans,Ha-giang, Lao-kay, and the port of Hai-phong.
Since early in July, the Japanese had also insisted on the
following demands:
a)The supply ot prOVisions and munition to the Japan-
ese Army at Kwangsi through Tonkin;
b)The right faculty tor this Army to send the wounded
and the sick to the Tonkinese hospitals;
c)Partioularly,the right ot transit for the Japanese
forces toward Yunnan thrOUgh TOnkin.69
General Catroux ~iscerned in these demands the possibility
of exploitation in favor ot the French interests; on July 9,1940
he granted per.missioO tor the operation of Japanese supply ser-
vices through Indochina, and the right to evaouate the wounded
and the sick into his territorY. The next day, Ae told the Jap-
67. Decoux, OR.cit., p.e8
68. The New York ~imes, August 2, 1945, p.7
69. Decoux, 2R.clt., pp.&8-69
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anese authorities that h~ was disposed to let then supply
munitions to their army at Kwangsi and evacuate this army
through the Tonkinese delta, provided that Japan would
guarantee to respect the French sovereignty on Indoohina and
on the Spratley Islands, and to withdraw their torces trom
Hainan. In response to this proposal, General Nishihara hint-
'10ed the possibi~lty of a military alliance.
Up to July 10, 1940, General Catroux conducted the nego-
tiations with the Japanese Gene~a+t Nishihara, at his own dis-
cretion, without inro~ing the French Goverbment, now moved to
Vichy. When General Nishihara suggested a military alliance,
Catroux asked the.advlce ot the Frenoh AJIlbassadorat Tokyo.
Atter tive days, Ambassador Arsene-Henri warned that "we are
here on a very dangerous ground". The secret ot General Catroux
was thus leaked out and on July 18, 1940 he was ordered by Vichy
to suspend all ~egotiations and to transmit the government ot
71Indochina to Viee-Admiral Decoux.
In the atternoon of July 19. 1940, his last day in ottice,
General Catroux had a long talk with his successor. In conclu-
sion, ~e said:
Since the beginning, I resolved to go beyong the
Japanese demands so to unbend the relations with the
J&panese missien and to create a favorable a~osPhere
to our conversations. To this effect, I have closed
up the frontiers to the e~pl)rt into 6hins, and I just
have done the same thing to the reverse movement tor
'0. Deooux, op.oit., p. 69
71. Atter the occupation ot Paris by the Germans, the
Freneh Government moved to Bor~eanx, and, on June 50, 1940,
trom Bordeaux to Vichy, Ga~con oe.cit. II, 869
*
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a month, at the request of the mission, despite the many
damages suoh a measure would oause to us. It will be up
to you to re-open the frontiers on August 7, in the direo-
tion of China-Indoohina. •
I bave eVen admitted the establishment ot a mixe air-line over Oanton and Hanoi, and aooepted in prinoiple the
installation of a cable between canton and Hai-phong. All
this represents a great assistance to the Japanese. So,
in return, I demand the conclusion of an accord which wou14
guaraptee the maintenanoe of the Frenoh sovereignty on Indo-
china. I have added that, suoh an acoord, of oourse, would
be negotiated between Tokyo and Vichy, but that, it the
Japanese Government gives me right now the fundamental guar-
antee in question, I would be in measure to acoentuate my
polioy at sUPPorting Japan.
But, time rolled by while the politel guarantee, Which
I disoounted to be gr$nted and whioh was promised to me,
is not notified to me. On the oontrary, the mission was
developening its aotivities and aocentuating its enoroaoh-
ments. We bave, therefore, reached the point where, in
my opinion, it behooves us to stitfen our attitude, to
react against the unbearable abuses of the Japanese and
henceforth, to canton the mission in the strict execution
ot its mandate. That will be your i~ediate task. 72
So, on July 20, 1940, ended a phase of the Indochinese his-
tory which Paul ,Baudouin, the Frenoh Foreign Minister at the
Government of Petain, called. the ~Phase Catroux". 73
General Catroux was blamed for his policy.
But, it he had stiftened his attitude toward the Japanese
right in ~he beginning ot the Japanese enoroaohment on Indochina
, Japan would have invaded the French colony before any other power
co~d have taken any measure against it, and then WOQld haTe pre-
sented its oceapatioA a'_a fait aecompli. ?4
~2. Decoux, op.oit •• PP.6e-~2
73. Ibid., p.95
'4. Garcon, op.cit., 1,276
The United States and Indochina in
The First Indochinese Crisis
June-September, 1940
The Japanese Ocoupation
of North Indoohina
September 1940
It August, 1940, was a month of activity tar the Jap-
anese auth~rities, September was a month of realization.
Of course, to break the status gu~ and to get into Indo-
ohina was regarded as a ditfioult undertaking if the United
States stood tirmly upon its established rights and policies.
Nevertheless, Japan went head with its program and, at the
end ot September, 1940, the Japanese military felt at home
in Hanoi, the capital of Indochina.
The political agreement signed by Franoe and Japan on
Indochina on August 29, 1940, was to go into effect after
the conclusion of a military accord to be negotiated, on
the spot, at Hanoi, between the military authorities of the
two countries. Here, difficulties arose, because of the per-
sistent opposition of Vice-Admiral Decoux to any arrival of
Japanese troops.l
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On July 20. 1940. Vice-Admiral Jean Decoux began his
Government General ot French Indochina. After the long talk
he had had the day betore with his predeoessor. General Georges
Catroux, he was more contirmed than ever in his view ot "de-
fense and no defiance"2 against Japan. The next day, when tor
the tirst time he received the Chiefs of'Services of his ad-
ministration, he proclaimed that "whatsoever would be the grav-
ity of the sitaationwhich I should have to oonfront with, I
would not be a liquidator'of' Indoohina".2
To General Nishihara. who~ he met some days later, he
showed the same firmness. In his own aooount, he said:
I declared without equivocation that he had not
to rely on me in treating the questions whioh were
beyond my competence. or exceed my personal responsi-
bilities. I added that I would aot only in full con-
tormity with the French Government, Which, of course.
should remain in the serious circwnstanoes of the mo-
~ent the only master of' important deoisions to be taken.3
On July 23. Vice-Admiral Decoux telegraphed to Vichy
telling the Government what his predecessor had done. saying:
My conclusion, atter a thorough examination of the
situ.atien, is tbat cOIlCessions, very big, going even be-
yond what they (the Japanese) dem,anded, have been .ell
the Japanese wit.hout any counterpart, to the effec' ot
creating a favorable atmosphere,in view ot obtaining
from them guarantees.
Facts, however, have proved that our concessions
had the unique result of developing Japanese appetites.
The expected counterpart, whioh, trom another principle
exceeds the power ot the Governor General, has not been
~corded, and I doubt that it will ever be •
...
2. Jean Deooux, oE.oit., p.78
3. Ibid. pp. 91-92
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I am eager to put a good order to these errors, to
stop the Japanese encroachments, to reopen the frontier
to a certain extent, atter a previous accord of the Jap-
anese mission on the goods to be transported or trans-
ited. I will also try not to make any concession without
inmediate and substantial counterpart, but I am placed in
a serious state ot tact, t~nding in reality to a peaceful
conquest ot Indochina by Japan. I will try to reduce the
Japanese mortgage, of whicb I have to take into account.
To this effect, it would be of interest to come back
to normal methods. I propose,therefore, to deal on looal
questlonswith. General Nishihara, and to submit to yOll
the conclusions, Which I have arrived at, so as ~o en-
able you to get in touch with the Government ot Tokyo by
normal diplomatic avenues.
On July 27, the French Government, atter deliberation,
gave tull agreement to the plan sketched by the Governor Gen-
eral ot Indoohina. ~boldened by this blessing, Vice-Admiral
Deeoux, on J~y 29, oouldreply to General Nishihara, who
would leAve the next day tor Tokyo to report the result of
his mission to the new Japanese Ga.binet, that the:Governor
General eould not agree with Japan on the following points:
a) Interd1ctien ot all transit ot Japanese troops'across Indochina.
b) Interdiction ot transport ot ammunition and war mat-
erial, save provisions, tor the Army ot Kwangsi.
c) Interdiction ot the establishment ot a Japanese
station ot wireless telegraph in the Indoohinese territory.5
While Vice-Admiral Deeoux was proud ot his attitUde, the
. 6Japanese had just set a program to ourb him. In fact, On July
27, the Japanese Government had made a great decision. The
4. Decoux, Op.cit.,P.93
5. Ibid.p.92
6. 'fheprogram was not intendeEl to curb Deooux in person.
It was ot a general scope~ but applied to IndOChina, it kept
in check the aims of the r~ench Governor General,
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Liaison Conterence, the tir t ot its kind, whose po r w nt
beyond that ot the Cabinet and the Court, had approv d
policy present d by the new Cabin t ot Prince Fum1maro Konoye,
called "Gist ot the Main Point in Regard to Dealing with the
Situation to Meet the Change in orld Conditions". The story
how this policy was arrived at is worth telling.
In July 1940, the Japanese militarist were becoming in-
creasingly dis atistied with the Cabinet ot Admiral Yonai. It
as the Yonai Government which tailed to take over the French
Indochina when the tall ot Franoe ott r d an excellent op-
portunity tor such an undertaking. Late in Jun , the Japanes
torces were tWio re dy to inTade Indoohina, but tWio they
had to withdraw beoause ot the relatively oiroumspeot prooe ure
of the Gov rnment, because ot the diplomatio opposition ot
other nations, and beoause ot the adroit maneuverings ot Gen-
eral Catroux. The oonversations between the Japanese Ambass-
ador, Saburo Kurusu, with Joachim R1bbentrop tell also tar
7short ot the hopes ot Admiral Yonsi, who, on July 7 sent Naotake
Sato, a tormer Foreign Minister, for a good-will mission to
Berlin. Sato did gather the tact that Germany had no ambitions
in respect to the Frenoh nd Dutoh oolonies in the Far East,
at least tor the time being, but did not get any pledges fro
Ribb ntrop.a The reason was that R1bbentrop tollowed the re-
7. Naotake sato came to Berlin on July 8,lg40.See Intern-
ational Mi~itary Tribunal,Far East Tokyo,1946- • r:COrd p.6l70
by F.C.Jon.s, in his Japan's New Order fP East As aelts Rise
nd Its Fall 1937-45 p.222
8. ~'PP6187-40; Jones,Ibid p.223
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commendations of the German Ambassador in Japan who held that
Germany would probably give Japan a tree hand in Indochina only
"if Japan obliges herself to tie down America in the Pacifio
area, perhaps by a pr~ise to attack the Philippines and Hawaii
in the event ot America' 8 entry into the war against Germany. "9
But these conditions did not influence the Yonai Cabinet as;
it appeared in th~ broa~cast ot the Japane~e Foreign Minister,
Hachiro Arita, who, on Jane 22, 1940 had mentioned Japan's
policy ot non-involvment in European attairs.lO
~o.cop.with the cold attitude.ot Ribbentrop, the Foreign
Ministry ot the Yonai aabine~ drafted a German-1apanese agree-
ment and discusse~ it w1.t~ representatives.ot the Army and Navyll
on July 12 and 16. The proposals ot this agreement were that
Japan .should recognize.German.leadershlp in Eureope and Africa,
should.coopera\e with Germany, by measures short or war, in
b~inging al)out tlle surrender at Great Britain, and in ravoring
the position ot Germany in Itstrade with Greater East Asia,
that Germany and Japan should conter on the measures to be
taken, it eithe~ of both powers ~ere threatened by the USSR,
tnat both powers should prevent Amer~can interterence with
10. Tel. trom Ott to Berlin,June 2.,1940 (Toklo War
Crimes Do.cwnents, N,o. 40250) Cit,ed in The Challenge to Iso-
lation.19:i?-194G,by Wil.llam L. ;Langer and S.Everett Gleason,195t.~~•• 3ones. 0R.'~. p.22~,~ote 4
11. Th.em~mpers:were. An(lo and Ishizawa,Seetion chiets
at the F~reign.Minlstry'; Lt.ColQnel Takafama.ot the War
lI4inistry;Major Tanemur.a,ot Army General Statt; Comm.Shiba,
Qt Navy Minis,try -t and Captain On~,. ot Naval G$neral Statt.
1Jrl'-j'E.Exhtb1! Nos.52? 8.o.d,.528.S,ti Jones,OR.e!1 p.224,note 1
FeiB,OR.e-l~,.7~,
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their respective activities in Europe and in Asia. In re-
turn Germany should support Japan in its ambitions over the
South Seas region, including French Indochina and Netherlands
12East Indies.
But time had run out ror the Yonai Cabinet. The militar-
ists were already out of Patience; they talked ot assassination;
they plotted to kill all. the leading advocates of triendship
of the United states and Great Britain,13 at the end, they
bluntly asked tor a oabinet change. 14 On July 16, the Mini-
ster of War, G$neral Shuroku Hata, powerless to control the
Army, resigned, and so did the Prime Minister.15 The next day
tormer Prime Ministers and senior members ot the Privy Council
oonven~d to ohoose a successor to Admiral Mltsumasa Yonai, a
man WhO should be able to manage as "having the oonsent ot the
Army and being close to them".16 That same night the Emperor
issued an imperial mandate, to Prince Fuminaro ROnoye to torm
17a new government, which was practically set up on July 18.
On the evening ot JUly 19, 1940, though they would be
tormally invested with power only three days later, the
Foreign Miaister. Yosuke Mat.u.0ka,the Minister of War,
11&12 The members were Ando and Ishizawa,Seotion chiets
ot Foreign Ministry; Lt.Co1.Takayame.ot the War Ministry;Major
Tanemura,ot Army General Statt.; Comm..Shib, of Navy Ministry, .
and Capt. oao , ot Nval General Statt .•IMTFE,Exhibit, No.52?
and 528.8ee Jones,0~.Clt •.p.224,note 1; Feis,~tclt.p.7g13. "Kido Diarytf.•entry for July 5,1~40;-See l'eis.Op.cit
p.'l8
14. IMTFE Diary Exhibi~,No.5205;Feis.Loc.cit.
15. "Kido Diary",entry tor July 16 & I'.Feli.OS.Cit.P.?9
16. IMTFE !!!!. No.3340;Feis.lbid p.80;Langer.2P.c1t.p.606
17. lMTFE.Loe.cit. Bee also ~e Undeclared W$r~oy William
L.Langer and S.Everett Gleason,p. 4. FeIs.!!!! p.80
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Lieutenant-General Hideki Tojo, the Minister of Navy. Vice-
Admiral Zenga Yoshida, m.et with the Prime Minister tor an
exchange ot vJews. What was going on in that important meet-
ing can be seen in these few words of Prince Konoye, who
said that "•••••because Matuoka spoke out as though he ad-
vocated war with the United States, the Navy Minister was
aghast at first. However, he was. placated when Matsuoka
followed with moderate explications".
Atter a week of intra-ministerial de~1beratioas, and ot
discussions w1th the court aDd military men, the new cabinet
approved the result on July 26, 1940.,.Wl.der th,etitle: "Gist
ot the Main Points in_R~gard to.Dealing with the Situation
to Meet the C~anse in Wor~d Condition~".l1 In this very im-
portant politioal doeument two $sin purpo~es were set forth:
a) to hasten tbe end ot the confliot.in Ohins; b) to solve
the problem of the south ,!ithinsuchsco~e .!.S would not le!,d
to wa:r:~with .o!ler 20wers (1t8110s of Feis)' 19 When the Liaison
Oonference adopted this policy on the following day, it made
H. #
18. IMTFE. Exhibit No. 1310; Feis. 02.etl. p. 84. About
this program Herbert Feis r~marked: w.tike aI;ost all Japanese
official documents (and not only Japanese) ot the sort, this
was so oomposed to allow d1fterent detinition~ by difterent
persons _.atdifferent times. The ambiguity was useful. Gaps
in meaning served to conceal secret purposes; obsourity ot
phrase permitted future twists of aim. Autbority within Japan
could become unified only in a haze. ~berefore the student
can never be sure of exact shades ot intent, or eveh that he
has culled out trom the many parts and sections those thatwere most .tneant".
19. The summarization.is or Herbert Feis, Q2.cit.,P.85
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its decision.s:
(1) To maintain a firm attitude toward Amerioa on
the one hand; to effect on the other hand a sweeping
readjustment of Japanese relations with the USSR, as
well as a political combination with Germany and Italy.
(2) To take stronger measures against French Indochina,
Hong Kong and foreign concessions in China looking to
the prevention ot aid to the Chiang regime ••• (3) Topractice more vigorous displomacy toward the Netherlands
East Indieast in order to acquire vital materials. 20
The Konoye cabinet carried out faithfully these deoisions
during its year in office. But even before it began to work,
dissensions reappeared. Thus K~rqu1s K1do, the Lord Keeper of
the Privy Seal, reoorded an observ8tion of the Emperor:
I was reoeived in audienoe and told by His Majesty
his impression in regard to the execution ot the plaBs
decided at the Imperial Liaison Oonference (of JUly 27).
The Government body, Army and Navy cliques, all hold
ditferent ideas in regard to the xeeution ot the plan.
Premier Konoye believing that t~e China incident cannot
be easily settled, wants to try to reduce the area of
occupation in Ohina and start the southward operation.
Thus he seems to be trying to divert the discontent ofthe people over the failure ln Chlna towards the South.
The Army wants to leave the situation ln China as it
ls, and to advance south if there ls an opportunity.
~~~iih~h:a:~rs~:m~~f~ ~~e:e~~ie~:silto dvance south
20. Feis, Loc.cit. The Japanese based their decisions on
the principle of self-defense. But ~erbert Feis observed rightly
that: "The concept of national self defense hasss many hues
as a rainbow. Each country has its filter, and eaoh bends the
rays to its own wants and fears. To the men w~o wrote Japanese
policy in JulYt1940tnational selt-defense meant any action deem-ed neoessary to place Japan in a position to win a war ln case
it could not achieve its aims without war •••lt seeks to oonceal
asS£esslve (sic) and threatenl~ Ja2anese aim-S;-bl stressfns
the strate~c jQstrtIcatIon ol~apaneseJneasures.p. 86 !b!~.The
LIaIson Co erence4was attended by the leadIng cabinet offi-
cers and the Chiefs ot Statt ot Army and Navy.
21. "K1do Diary·, entry tor July 30,1940; Feis.OP.elt.p.87
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Amidst these differences of opinions, one thing emerged
clearly, namely to use the expression ot Ambassador Grew, "Japan
22goes hell-bent toward the Axis".
During these days when Japan planned policy touching Amer-
ica, the United States, on its part, though particularly of
Japan, and not in a nice manner.
Early in July 1940, r~or was afloat that Japan attempted to
bUy great quantities of aviation gasoline and lubricants. The
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, for example, on July 18,
reported to the st~te Department that Ja~an was Offering to
buy any and all quantities. At the same time, according to
word sent to Washington by the American eonsuls at Kobe and
Osaka, Japan was planning to acoUD1!l1ulatestooks on Hai~an Is-
lands. These indioations were oonclusive ot an imminent south-
ward movement ot the Japanese.23
On July 19, 1940,.the Seoretary of State left for a eon-
ferenoe of the Am,ariean Rep~blics at Havana, without definite
ideas on how to oope with the new developments in the Pacific.
But other officials ot the Government were thinking of a solu-
tion. The e~en1ng before at a dinner where Henry L. Stimson,
the Secretary of War, Frank Knox, the Seoretary ot the Navy,
Henry Morgenthau,Jr., the Seoretary at the Treasury, were
present with the Br1tish Ambassador, Lord Lothian, and the
j -
22. Joseph C. Grew. Ten Years in Jaren. p.324. fhis book
is a oont~porery reoord drawn trom the d aries and private
and official papers ot the U.S.Ambassador in Japan,from 1932-1942
23. Fels. Op.~it. p.89
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Australian Minister, Richard G. Casey, an idea was brought
out "that we now had an opportunity under the new l~gisla-
tion of stopping the supplies of oil to Japan.24 The next
morning, Morgenthau su.ggested to th,ePresident: "There is a
possibility that a plan can be quickly developed with the
eo-operation of the British GoverIl$ent to stop oil and gas-
oline tor Jap~n. Lord Lothian, whose proposal it partly is,
is enthusiastic about its possibilities and will ascertain
25his Government's reaction, should you deem the plan teasib1e".
This was the plan: The United States was, on tbe
ground of national defense, to stop all exports ot oil;
Britaiu was to ~et all its oil trom the Carribean area;Britain and the United States were to buy up any sur-
plus production in that area; Britain was to arrange with
the Dutch government to destroy the oil wells in the
Indies; and, tinal1y, it was to concentrate bo~bing at-
tacks on the synthetic oil plants in Germany. Where 26
then, and how, would Japan. and Germany get oil for war?
The plan sounded good, and the President convoked Stim-
son, Knox and Sumner Welles, t.b.eActing Secretary ot State,
to the White House for discussion.
The President pointed to the map across the room
and said that be had sat there day atter day watching
the map and that he finally came to the conclusion that
the only way out of the diffieulties of the world was
by starving of the people ot Europe, particularly in
regard to their supply of fuel to carryon the war ••••
The President ~~s ideas by Which America could, acting
Qader the recent legislation, prevent all of the pet-
roleum. supplies - particularly aviation oil - trom going
to the Nazi Axis powers. American oil could be stored
in the ground and the cost of the Government buying it
in that condition would be comparatively small. This
-- A24.
July 18,
25.
26.
Unpublished diary ot Henry L. Stimson,entry tor
1'40. cited by Feis, Loc.cit.
St~son diarY,entry tor :uIy 19,1940; Feis,loc.cit
The plan is summarized by Feis,op.elt. p.90
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would prevent oil from going to Spain and through Spain
to the Germans. Great Britain would take care ot the
Ven£uelan supplies, and so on. When they got to the
Far Eastern side, S~er Welles put in an ob~ection that
an embargo against Japan would cause Japan to make war
on Great Britain. I ventured to doubt this 'and the
question came up of whether or not the New Netherlands
wells could not be put out of commission and thus Japan
deprived of her Objective tor going to war with Great
Britain. Altogether 1t was a long-and interesting dis-
cussion but whether or not it wa& intended to be a tac-
tual one was left in the air. 27
New develop$ents proved that it was intended to be a
tactual one. The next day, July 20, 1940, the President sign.-
ed a bill for a two-oeean Navy, desigaed to enable the United
28
States to deal not enly with Ger~a~y, but with Japan as well.
Two days later, the Treasury statt presented to tbe President
t~e Text ot a procl~ation, placing under control export of
all kinds of oil_and all scrap ~etals. Sim~ltaneously, the
President received. a telegt'iilmtrom General De Witt,Commander
at San Francisco ot the 9th Corps Area, reporting that trem-
endous Japanese purchases of aviation gasoline were being made-
and concluding: "Should the Arm, and Navy need it in quantity,
during tbe next six to nine months there would be a shortage
of a~iation gasoline it thase Japanese purchases are oonsummat-
ed". 29
The President. on July 26, 1940, signed the proclamation
and informed the press ot its contents. Aecordingly, news-
papers spread a lang~8ge that meant an "embargo". The New-
York T~es announced: "Embargo put on Oil,Scrap Metal, in- ,
.. -21. St~son diary,entry tor July 1~,1940 cited by Fais,cit.loc
28. The New York Times, July 21, 1940,p.l
29. Feis, op.clt. p.92
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30License Order by Roosevelt".
But in the atternoon ot the same day, when the proclama-
tion was sent to the state Department tor countersignature,
Sumner Welles hurried to persuade the President to discard it
in tavoro( a lesser one. The Presiden~ agreed. In the new
text, signed on July 26, the President said;
Now, theretore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
ot the United States ot ~rtca, acting under and by vir-
tue ot the authority vested in me by the said act ot
Congress (Aot to Expedite the strengthening ot the National
Detence, approved July 2, 1940) do hereby proclaim that ••••
I have determlped that it is necessary in the interest ot
the national defense that on and atter August 1, 1940,
the additional materials hereinafter listed, shall not be
exported trom the United states except when authorized in
each case by alioense as provided tor in the aforesaid
proclamation:
1. Petroleum products
2. Tetraethyl lead 31
3. Iron and steel scrap
It is obvious that the regulatiGJ1s dealt nG more with all
kinds of 011 and all scrap materials, as they were drawn up in
the first document. But these beitations and correotions would,
in tlwe, loose their raison dte~t~, When the Japanese encroach-
ments became real i~ Frenoh Indochina.
Atter the week of discussions and planning came the t~e
tor action.
On July 26, 1940, the day when the United States proclaimed
restrictive measures against Japan, as it is just said, the Jap-
- ..30.The New Y~k T1mes,July 26,1940 p.l That same day, the
New York Herald Tribune gave the story under this heading: "U.S.
!iibargo Is Clamped on ietals and 01ls •
. 31. DeEartmen~.qtState Bulletin,July 27,1940(vol.III.No.57)
p.49.The text Is reprInted In Fore~~lat1ons ot the Un1t~d
StatesLJap!Bj 1931-1941, II 216,217
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anese Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new cabinet met the
American Ambassador in Tokyo. In this interview, Yosuke Matsuoka,
according to Joseph C. Grew, "referred to an article which he
had written some time ago stating that if the United States and
Japan ever have to fight each other they should know precisely
the causes and reasons for which they were fighting and that
if war comes, it should not develop, as in so many other cases
in history, through misunderstanding". As if to clear up a pro-
bable misunderstanding between the two countries, the Foreign
Minister expressed the concept of history of the Japanese people.
Mr. Matsuoka then said that history is based largely
on the operation of blind forces Wh~gh in a rapidly movingworld cannot always be controlled.
Matsuoka was not content to make this notion known only to
Grew, but still wanted him to convey it to the President of the
United States.. To quote Grew:
Mr. Matsuoka asked me now to express privately to the
President that he shared his. lifelong hope and interest inthe preservation of world peace. He added, however, that
he had come to ~derstand that since the world is constant~y
evolving, changing and growing, peace cannot be safeguarded
by adhering to the status quo. The League ot Nations failed
he said, because its4member states had not had the courage
to implement Ar~icle 19 ot the Covenant, which provides foradjustments to meet such evolution and changed circumstances.
A new order must come into being in the world, and the peace
of the world must have as its foundation our adaptation to
the developm~~t and change. 33
The tenor of this message rehearsed the doctrine of the
"Gist ot the Main Points in.Regard to Dealing with the Situation
32. Grew,or.Cit.entry tor July 26,1940, under the title
"First conversat on with Foreign Minister Matsuoka". p.322
35. ~,p.323
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to Meet tbe Change in World Conditions", that the Japanese
Cabinet stenciled down in indelible ink on that very same
day. It was also an orthodox continuation of the Japanese
militarist line of thoughts tracing back to the Tanaka Mem-
34orial in 1927, and to the diplomatic reply of Japan to the
request of Open-door of the United States in 1938.35 On this
message, the President oommented that ~a genuine and durable
world peace, in our opinion, ca~ot be aChieved by other than
orderly prooesses and by dealing fairly and justly, both of
Which entail respect for the rights of all ooncerned, and
36
whioh allow all nations to attain their legitimate aspirations."
But, before this answer reaohed the Japanese Minister, Japan
.had begun to carry out its expansionist policy.
On August 1, 1940, the Japanese Government announoed the
summary of its fundamental national polioies, the basic ata
of which "lies in the firm establis~ent ot world peaoe in ao-
cordanoe with the lofty spirit of Bakko.lohia, in which the
34. !hft Tanaka Memorial, is a·report that Baron Gilchi
Tanaka was suppose~ to have given his Emperor, on July 25,1927.
It expresses the views ot the militarists, espeoially in the
passage, that,tollows: "In the future,it we want to control China
we must tirst orush the United States, just as in the past we
had to tight in the Russo-Japanese War. 'But, in order to oon-
quer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In
order to con uerworld, we.:must tlrst:conquer,~Qhi·na.:~·Ifwe :',
Sucoeedto .;oonqnerChina, ',there.iitot the Asiatio countries
and the South Seas oountries will tear us and surrender. Then
the world will realize the Eastern Asia is ours and will not
dare to violate our rights."OttoD.Tolisohus, Through Japanese
Exes. p. sa
35. ForeiS; Retations ot the United States,Japan 1.80036. Grew.~,rt. entry tor August 3,1940,unde~ the title"President RooseT~t~eplies to Foreign Minister Matsu0ks,"p.323
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country was founded, and in the construction, as the first
step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its
toundation the solidarity ot Japan. ManchoukuG and Ohina".37
More explicit, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on the same
day, stated that "aocordingly the immediate aim ot our for-
eign poliey at present is to establish, in aocordance with
the lotty spirit ot the ~ (Imperial way) a great East
Asian ohain of common prosperity with the Japan-Manchoukuo-
China group as one ot tbe links". 38 It was understood that
the next link would be French Indochina; because, without
delay, he handed a memorandum to the Frenoh Ambassador,Charles
Arsene-Henri,requesting that France provide bases and trans-
it facilities in Indochina to Japanese troops, and threatening
39torce; 1tFrance did not yield.
The following day, in Indochina, the acting head ot the
Japanese military missioB, Colonel Kemryo sato, who represent-
ed also the Japanese South China Army, delivered to Vice-
Admiral Decoux a document, in torm ot an ultimatum which in-
cluded the tollowing passage.
The project ot Franoo-Japanese detensive alliance
wn!oh General Catroux had initiated implies a ~ilitary
collaboration. It is an abso~ute and immediate necessity
to solve the China Incident, and the transit ot Japanese
~oops in Indoch~na is the very son! or that allianoe.
Consequently, Colonel Sato demands the transit ot troops
37. Foreige Relationa ot the United Statesala~an,I.109
Hakko Iohlu means "t'heworld a. one family".38. IDid p.lll
39. lM±fE,Rtoord, p.6922; Jones,op.cit.p.22740. Decoux,qp.cit. (see next page)
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sent against Chiang Kai-shek, the atilization of Indo-
chinese air bases of Which the Japanese troops assume
charge; finally, all facilities for the transportation
of arms, munitions and provisloAs.
It was added that the resistance of the Governor General
to suoh demands was "difficult to understand and without
grounds, and that in case of C~inese incursion into Indochina,
Japan would have to enter also for its legitimate defense, and
summarily that the projected alliance would be realized immed-
iately, otherWise Franco-Japanese relations would end up by
falling into worse conditions". 40
This document mirrored exactly the mind of Foreign Mini-
ste~ Matsoukaj so Vice-Admiral Decoux was told when alarmed,
he inquired of' the French Amb~ssador in Tokyo.
Also, on August 2, 1940, while in Japan, Matsuoka inform-
ed Ambassador Ott of' the Japanese iDltiatives on Indochina and
asked Germany not to object to them but to help them in putting
pressure on Vichy.4l The French Government got the news of the
Japanese aims trom Arsene-Henri. Sig reactions ensued, from
which it resulted that "the propositions of'Mr. Matsuoka ap-
peared to be a.simple step toward complete military occupation
of Tonkin, which would be itself the prelude of transformation
of Indochine into an ocono~ic annex of Japan and 8 colony for
Japanese settlement. The Fran.en teared that concessions would,
furthermore, amount to an active association with "Japanese
T 40. Decoux,01!.cit.p.'4; Charles-Roux,op.oit.p.250:Langer,
h~ ~ndeclared War,p.g
il. IM11i,~cord,PP.6295-6jJones,02.cit.p.227
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aggression against China", and would strain their relations
with the United states, which just gave a blow to Japan by
restrictions on export of aviation gasoline and scrap iron.
The French Government, therefore, replied to Japan with a
highly conditional tone, requiring that first Japan sbould
recognize "the French sovereignty on Indochina, the integrity
of the Indochinese Union and the Fren¢h interests in the Far
East". After that the French would consider what facilities
they shOUld accord to japan.42
At the same time, the French-Minister of Oolonies sent
to the Governor General of Indochina this telegram:
The Japanese Government has delivered to our Am.
bassador a memorandum in Which it demands urgently the
free transit of Japanese troops thrGugh Tonkin, the
installation of air bases. and an agreement in principle
to an almost total attao~ent of the Indochinese economy
to that of Japan. These demands are aooompanied by oral
threatenings. We have just answered in the negative. But
we have proposed to open immediately a negotiation Which
wou.ld cover a wide range ot sUbjects. :Bel ready, then.
to repel by foree any attack from J~pan. But avoid care-
fully any troubleAwitb the members of the Japanese Con-trol Commission. ..3
Fro.rnnow on the Vichy Government became occu.pied with the
Japa~ese. It had to renew the- policies ot General Catroux which
it had repudiated. Hardly bad it replie(l to Tokyo before it
turned to the United States tor help. It 1nstructed Count
Saint-Quentin, the French Ambessador in Washington. to inform
the American Government ot the Japanese demands and to make it
42. Charles-Roux,op.c1t. pp.250-25l
43. Decoux,o;e. c1t•• pp. 95-6 .Telegram from Vichy to
the Governor General-at Hanoi, August 3, 1946
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known that "the resistance of the French Government to the
Japanese demands would necessarily depend to a large extent
on the nature and effectiveness of the support which the'
American Government would be disposed tG give it.44 Unfor-
tunately, the French Ambassador could only, on August 6, 1940
report to his Government the following indication of James o.
Dunn, the Politic.l Advisor of the State Department:
We have been doing and we are doing everything
possible to keep the situation of the Far East staQilize4.
F~rthermore, we have been taking various steps to mani-
t st the economic pressure of the. United States, and we
have been keeping our Fleet based on Hawaii. Our posi-
tion toward the development of events in the Far East
is well known. It is an indication of our actual atti-
tude and our future aotivities. We hope that the nego-
tiations, which have been projected, oan be delayed as
long as possible, given the internal ituation whioh is
susceptible of evolution".45
When Count-Saint-Quentin was given ~hese explanations, he
asked Mr. Dunn if they "meant that the United States would not
44. Memorandum from the French .Ambassy in Washington,
August 6, 1940., oIted by Langer, 0i.cit., p.lO
45. Charles-Raux. QR.cit. p. 51. In the memo to the Under
Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn w~ote "I told the French Ambassa-
dor that we have been doing and are doing everything possible
within the framework of our establiShed policies to keep the
situation in the Far East stabilized; that we have been progress-
ively taking various steps, the effect of which has been to
exert economic pressure on Japan; that our Fleet is no based in
H~waii, and that the course which we have been following,as in-
dicated above, gives a clear indication of our intentions and
activities for the future. I also raised with the French Ambass-
ador the question Whether it would be practicable for the Frenoh
to delay discussion with the Japanese with respect to Indochina
for the periQd. Memo fQr~ Mr. Dunn to Under Secretary of State
PWelles, Aug. 6, 1940, cited in Langer,op.clt.p.lO. See alsorivate Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 188-193 --
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use military or naval force in support of any position which
might be taken to resist the Japanese attempted aggression on
Indoohina"46 Because Mr. Dunn did not make any effort to
correot this interpretation, Co~nt Saint-Quentin ooncluded
in his report to the French Gevernment:
The United States will not take any decisive measure
against Japan, as long as the threat ot a tinal victory
of Ge.rmany over Great Britain will not be discarded. 47
The French Government, however, wa$ disappointed by this
ltuninterested attitude Of the United State~r". On .August 8,1940
when, in Indoohina,. Vice-Admiral Decou rejoiced on the news
that Sato's threat was disavowed.by the :8psn.ese Government48
ViChy intormed Washington ot the line at conduct it was going
to take. The French Foreign Minister telegraphed to Count
Saint-Q,uentin:
The f~ct that the American Government is not in a
position, at a t~e when the Japanese pressure becomes
precise, to give concrete etfects to its poliey, com-
pels us to seek a line of conduct susceptible to avert
~ediate risks which are threatening us. In doing so,
we will try all our possible conduQts to gain t~e.49
But the Un.ited States, on its part, was also doing its
best though witbin the trameworkot its "established policies",
to give a helping hand to the French. The State Department,
atter getting reports ot new dema~ds by Japan on French Indo-
china, had already called "these to the attention or the
46.
4'7.
48.
49.
Oharles-Roux,op.cit. p.252
Loe.cit.
tieeoux,~cit. p.96Charles- uX.Op.e1t.p.252
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Japanese Foreign Office~.50 In fact, on August 0, 1940, the
Acting Secretary 01" State, Sumner Welles, had instructed Grew
as follows:
New agencies have ca~rled reports that Japan has
~ade secret demands on France regarding French Indochina.
As reported, these demands include right on part of Japan
to move armed forces of Japan through that French poss-
ession, the rig~t $1" .rmed forces of lapan to use air
bases at certain points there, etc •••••
The statements given by the Secretary of State to
the press on April 17 and May 11, 1940, set forth this
Government's belief that (1) intervention in the domestic
affairs ot the Netherland East Indies, or (2) any altera-
tion, by other than peaceful processes, in their statusgUi would be prejUdicial to the cause of securitY,stab-
i1 ty, and peace in the entire Pacific area, not just in
the region in question. AlSO, there was set forth the
observation of the Government of the United States that
the belief restated in the preceding sentence was based
on a doctrine unequivoeallysupported by this Government
The same belief and the s~e observation naturally applys
to French Indochlna ,likewise. This Government is serious-
ly perturbed, therefore, over the demarche which it is
reported that the Go~ernment of Japan has made to the
French authorities.
If no objection is perceived, it is my desire that
at your early convenience yOu call upon the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and that you express to him, as under in-
struction from your Government and along the lines above
indicated, the concern felt by the Government of tgi
United States regarding the reported d~velopments.
In the,afternoon ot the next day. August 7, 1940,Ambassa-
ador Grew called on the Fo~eign Minister and conveyed him the
representation of the American Government as he was instructed
to do. Ambassador Grew said:
In replying to my opening remarks, the Minister said
that (1) he wished to withhold his comment; (2) that ad-
mitting certain demands had been made op Indochina,still
he eould not reveal their precise character; and (3)that
50. HUll,~R~'::.c±!.,I,903
51. Forei~-Relations o.fthe United, States, Japan, II 289-290
telegrwn from_t~ Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassadorin Japan,August 6, 1940
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in regard to the recent article in the New York Times,
a cabled report of whioh he had with him, he considered
its various points as either grossly exaggerated or com.
pletely unfounded. The Minister declined to comment on
the two demands listed in the Department telegram.
But the Japanese Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew
in strict confidence that "Japanese demands had been already
accepted in principle.by the French Government". Later, in
the same afternoon, however, Minister Matsuoka sent him a
message asking him not to disclose the object of his call.
To this, the ~bassador de~1ined to assent, and, in Grew's
words, "the Foreign Office informed us, atter turther tel-
ephone conversation that the press release would say that
I had oal1e~ to inquire about press reports pUblished a-
broad regarding late developments in relations between
French Indochina and Japan, and that the reports were de-
clared to be inaccurate by the Foreign Minister". 52
The mOPe oircum$peetly the Japanese Foreign Minister
tried pUblicly to deny his deman~s on French Indoohina,
the more earnestly he worked in secret. On August 9, 1940
the Vice Minister tor Forei~Atra1rs, Ch1chi OhaShi, present-
ed anew to the ~enoh Ambas~ador a dr_tt pretending to ob-
tain trom France the transit ot Japanese armed torces through
Indochina and the disposition ot air bases, at wireless stations,
ot means or commun!oations tor the Japanese troops which were
going to tigntChiang-Ea1-$hek.53 U~on a tirm retasal ot
M 52. Foreisn R~lations~t United,States,Japan.II290-291
emorandum by A1rl.bassadorin Japan,Aug.7,1940
53. Charles.Roux.O~.cit. p.253;Baudouin,~cit.pp193,19a-199
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Arsene-Henri,P4"he came again the next day with a revised
text, specifying the area which would be conceded to Japan-
ese use. Arsene-Henri still stood firm, requiring more pre-
eision, especially on the points needed for air bases. This
time Chiuchi Ohashi stOQ~ firm, pleading the need for military
secrecy, and the French A~bassador, with sigh and protest,
accepted tha Japanese proposal$. in principle.55
But these proposals were t~e subject of a vigorous reaction
at Vichy. General Maxima Weygand, the Minister of Defense,
who relied on the figares given by General Maurice-Pierre
Martin, the Chief of Staft of the Colonial Forces, favored a
eate~orical refusal,whatever the risks. Henri Lemer1, the
Minister for Colonies, and other Mi~isters were of the same
stand. Only Paul Baudouin, th~ French Minister for Foreign
Affairs had his own opini&n ontaia matter. PaUl Baudouin
was a former head of the Bank of Indoohina, should have
known bettar than anybody else the interests of France in
this possession. And he was of the view that "the conoessions
consented to the Japanese did not injure the independence of
OUr beautiful colony".56
This submissiVe attitude of Baudouin, coupled with the
new pressure of the Japanese Amba.ssadorin France, R.Sawada.
Iso . , 2JJii@P .....
64. IMTFE.Rocord,PP.688e-$e90,Jones,o~.cit.p.227
55. Ibid. PP.6892-~; Jones,loc.cit.
56. IiUrent,02.~lt., p.54
'1'1
who, on August 12, 1940, notitied that "the lapanese Govern-
57ment expeoted a oomplete and rapid acceptance of its demands"
discouraged the helpless french Government. On August 13,
therefore the latter decided not to reply to the Japanese by
an abrupt denial, but to allow Arsene-Henri to enter in the
road of concessions. 58 'I'h~ next day, the Japanese authorities
put neW pressare on the Frenoh ~bassador in Tokyo59. In Vichy
on August 15, the French Government dispatched new proposals
to Which Minister Matsuoka answered by threatening "military
action". 60 Tbat same day, .the Japanese Foreign Ministry re-
newed its requests tor Gerll18llsupport, Gut was told by Germany
that "our influence on French polley was limited". 61 Despite
this lukewarm Nazi friendship, the Japanese decided to go
ahead with their own plan.
Impressed and depres$td, ,the French Government reverted
to the methods ta.ken by General Catrol1X just two months earlier
and on the evening of August 16, 1940, they dropped for the
time being the idea of armed resistance against the Japanese.l!-
.....
,57. Baudouin.OE.o~.p.199
58. Decoux, OR.ert. p.96
59. Charle$-RQui,o~.eit p.253
60. Charles-Roux,t:ld.p.254
6l.IMTFE Record,pp.6295-6; Jones'!i.Cit.P.22762. l3audQtlIn.Op.cit.pp.203-4,2ll.!i this connection,
it is interesting to aote that the Frenoh historians used to
torget the real weakness of France, and to complain that the
United States was powerless; Jacques le Bourgeois,tor example,
in his Saigonsans.la.Ftancesaid:"Being consulted for 11
second tLie,the Americans expressed their powerlessness." p.6
see also Cbarles-Roux,op.cit.p.252
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On the fallowing day, the French Foreign Minister told the
American Charge d'Affaires at Vichy, Robert D. Murphy, that
!tinthe absence, of any material support from Great Britain
and the United States as distinguished trom the enunciation
of principl~stt, France telt oblige4 to 7ield.63 The same day,
Minister Baudouln informed tbe Chinese in regard to the gener-
~l terms ot the Franco-Japanese negotiations.64
On August 19, Foreign Minister Matsuoka made it clear to
the French Ambassador in Tokyo that military neoessities were
so urgent that he could not wait tor the French agreement. At
the same t~e, Vioe-Admiral Decoux advised Arsene-Henri not to
make any important concessions, saying:
I est~ate that in regard to military,naval or aerial
matters, we can cede nothing important, without bringing
damage to our sovereignty on Indochina and dangerously
compromising all French possessi.o.hsin the Far East. 65
Vichy w~s really embarassed by these developments. That
same day, the French authorities invited Robert D. Murphy to
their cabinet meeting and, afte],',intorm.inghim. of the Japanese
aims, asked him to transmit to Washington the following sugges-
tions:
In the event that we are forced to accord the transit
to the Japanese toroes, it would be opportune to have Tokyo in-
formed that the Governmentot the United States considers this
exped1tion as essentially temporary and wants to see these forces
definitely evacuate the ~ndochinese territory as soon as the
milltary_ operations in the Chinese territory would be ended.
QC& _ i -
63. Telegram from Murphy, August 17,1940, oited in Langger0R.cit. p.12 .
64. Decoux, 22.eit. p.247
65. Ibid ..Pp.9'1-9a
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Loyally the American Charge d'Affaires did as he was ask-
ed to, but he did not torget to confirm that "it would be vain
to expect the American Government anything other than a verbal
oondemnation of Japanese moves." 66
Robert D. Murphy was not wrong in his prediction. On
August 21, 1940, Count Saint-Quentin transmitted to Vichy the
conversation he just had with Sumner Welles, in Which the latter
said:
We understand the situation of the French Government,
and sinee we are not in a position to come to its assistance,
we do not teel that we have the right to reproach.it for
according military facilities to Japan. But, it we were
to recommend to TokyO that its ocoupation be temporary, we
would be accepting the principle ot it. But this would be
a violation of the status gu£, the maintenance of which
we shall oontinue to-insIst upon. 67
So, there was no hope trom the United States, tor the time
being. However, Vice-Admiral Dec0ux still preferred to risk an
68armed conflict with Japan rather than yield to Japanese demands.
He reoeived news of the Franoo-Japanese conversations trom the
French Embassy in TOkyo on August 20,21, and 22. Atter giVing
serious consideration. to them, he warned Viohy in a telegram,
dated on August 2~:The French Governor General said:
1. I estimate that all concessions in military matters
especially the ente~ing of Japanese troops in our terri-
tory and the utilization ot air bases, would amount to a
real peacetul transfer of Indochina to the dapanese Govern-
ment ••••The transit of troops once accepted,it would be
impossible to tight against new encroachments, which would
soon came to a total ejection of our authority and an de-
finite occupation or Tonkin as the first step;
66. Charles-Ro~x,Op.cit. p.255j see also Langer,op.cit.p.12
67. Loe.cit.
58. Decoux~Op.oit. p.97
eo
2. This capital conc sion would app ar to the eyes
of the Chines as a hostile act, coupled ith it tr -
cherous eharact r, and would inevitably ent il ev r r -
taliation on their part, a8Binst Tonkin, hich would at
onoe beoome the battlefield Of two b llig rents, swell
as against all our stablishments in China;
3. The Frenoh prestige, lr dy aff oted by the pr -
sence ot the Japanese mis ion, oould not with t nd the
consequences ot this new abandonment, whioh would withdraw
tro us the Indochinese popUlations and provoke again t
ranee violent reaotion on the part ot all the big pow rs
interested in the maintenance of the status guo in the
Far East.
What Vice-Admiral Decoux proposed a a solution was a r -
tusal, polite but tirm,"to all demand concerning military,
na al nd a rial matt6rs". 69
Vice- dmirel Decoux had an diate oonfirmation ot hi
s cond prOVision. In tact, on August 26, 1940, the Minister
tor Foreign Affairs ot Chungkung GoT rnment declared th t "
hene er the Japanese use the facilities acoorded th~ by
France to attack China through Indoohina, Chinese torces
will enter at once into Tonkin".70
On the tollowing day, th Governor Qen ral ot Indochina
a really angry when he learned the exact tenor or the ex-
change ot notes between Vichy and Tokyo. He could not help
sending to the rench Government hi representation, stating
that "haVing full oonsciousness ot y responsibility as head
ot the colony, and with p rsonal conviction ot serving the
superior interests ot IndOChina and or France, I protest
energetically against the solution trom weakness which Mr.
69. Decoux. O~.Cit. p.9870. !ill. p. 47
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Henry seems to judge inevitable".7l
The strong wording of this telegram as well as of other
similar against the policy of Vichy, would highly embarrass
those who defend Decoux as a skillful diplomat who had saved
Indochina by his timely concessions.72
But Paul Baudouin was more realistic. He challenged the
military figures given by General Martin du Gard, pointed out
that any resistance would lead to the total loss of Indochina;
and he was in a position to understand how ~reat would be this
lOBS, especially in the economic point of view. Therefore, on
AugUSt 29, 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka_snd Ambassador Arsene
Henry signed 8 political ,ccord, under the terms of which France
sanctioned the Jap~nese "~ew order" in French Indochina.73
- ..".""
Here are the main prQposition~ of this fundamental aecord:
1. The ~apanese Government recogQ!zed the Frencn
sovereignty in Indochina, and promised to respect its
territorial !nt~grity in all its parts;
2. France, on her part, admitted the preponderance
of Japan in the Far East, and agreed to accord certain
military facilities in Tonkin t,o Japanese forces, to
allow them to liquidate the China Incident;
3. A military oonvention should be concluded without
delay at Hanoi between the French and Japanese cOJDmands
to ar.range at the.best the manner Gt applying of the
political aceo~d.74
By the· accord ot August 29, 1940, the Japanese realized
a part ot their program set forth during the week of Jull
19-26, but it marked at the same time the.defeat of DecouX·s
f;!aa .. t ,f ...'
71, Decoux"Q;e.cit. p.99
72. Eour€.~1s.0P.cit. pp.8-12
73.,Charl~-Roux.6p.cit. p.258.Parcon,O;e.cit.,II,762
74. Decoux.o2.cit• p.l00
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stand. As for the United States, the result 01' its pro-
clamation or July 26, relating to restrictions 01' export
01' iron and oil remained undecided. This he$itating at-
titude was due to the divided opinion 01' the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, as previously reported. But the cause must
be tound in the public who did not see clearly the reason
Why the United states should enter into conflict with Japan
to saVe European colonialism.
Ih!LNew York Dail~ N!!!!, tor example, on August 5,1940,
editorially wrote:
•••••French Indochina is on the list ot properties which
Prinee Konoye hopes to pick up tor Japan. So are the·Dutch East Indies. So,apparently, is British-owned Hong
KOng; and it would surprise tew people it the American
owned Philippine IslandS Should, turn out to be on thatsame list.
There are sueh pickings in the Orient tor a strong,aggressive nation, like Japan when the western worldhas a major war going on. Prince Kanoye doesntt intendthat the grass shall grow under Japants teet while theWhite talks bleed themselves still whiter. The whole
structure which he pl~ns is to go by the resoundingname ot "the New Order tor Greater East Asia."
What puzzles us is Why so many Americans are so
worried by the prospect 01' these changes.
We cantt see any reason tor moral indignation overJapants e~pected seizure at the lands above mentioned.The Dutch never exercised demooracy in the Dutch East
Indi~s. They exploited those rioh islands and their
easy-going natlves methodically and thoroughly.
Certainly the Frenohdidn't bring the blessings at
democracy to Indoohina. They tarmed and mined it just
as the Dutch did the East Indies. Britishers in Hong-kong
have never been tamed tor a chummY,democratic attitude
toward the Chinese. When you come down to it, our ettorts
to bring demooracy to the Philippines have been pretty
much blocked by the Filipino's own dislike 01' us andall our ways.
It these territories should be taken over by the
Japanese, it would only mean a change 01' bosses tor their
inhabitants,most 01' whom probably wouldn't care, and pro-
bably would be neither better nor worse ott atter the
83
seizure.75
The next daY,August 6, 1940, the Washington Time-Herald
had imperative lines like these:
•••••••••••••••••••
Would it not be well to consider not only what might
happen to Japan, but what might happen to the United States.
Do we desire, like poor France, to precipitate a war
tor which we are not prepared?
How silly it seems now for France to be indicting Da-
ladier and his government for having gotten into war.
What satiSfaction can there be in such action?
How much better it would have been for France to have
kept out of war in Which it had so much to lose and solittle to gain.
How much better it would be for us to learn from the
experience ot others and keep out of a war for which we
are in no way prepared - not to one-tenth the extent thatFrance was prepared. .
We have nothing to gain in a war with Japan.
We have everything to lose.
There is nothing that Japan has that we.want to take.
There is nothing that we have that we want war with
Japan to destroy - not our youth - not our cities - not
our slowly reviving property - not our social system -
not our peace and happiness.
Let us realise and appreciate oUr benefits.
Let us conserve and protect our advantages.
Let us maintain the independence our fathers won for
us and the isolation God in his gOQdness gave us. 76
When many people ere thinking along these lines, the
administration could not overlook their opinion, although
many others tollowed the opposite direction. The etfQrts
ot the Government to combine both streams ot thought led to
the result that "during the month of August,1940, licenses
were issued tor the export of Japan ot $21,000,000 worth
75. Q2n~essional Record; 76th Congr.3rd Sess.vol.So,PP.4708-o9
76. ~. 76th.Congr.3rd Sess.vol.80,pp.4792-93
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ot American petroleum product, somewhat more than the total
for the entire first six months ot the year. In short, Amer-
77
ican oil was still tlowing f'reely to Japanese storage tanks."
This was the practice. In theorey, however, the United
States maintained a strong attitude toward Japan. When, on
August 3, the Japanese Embassy registered a protest against
the United States tor having singled out Japan tor discrim-
inatOr~ treatment in the export destinations of'aviation gas-
j
oline,'S the American Government, six days later, handed to
the Japanese Ambassador, Kensuki Horinouchi, a reply that
read
Heference is made to the Japanese Ambassador's note
ot August 3, 1940, in regard to action taken by the Gov-
ernment ot the United States, in pursuance ot section 6
Of the Act of Oongressapproved .duly 2, 1940 entitled "An
Act to expedite the strengthening at the national defense"
to restrict the export of'aviation gasoline trom the
United States. The Japanese Ambassador indicates that
the impression created by that action, in view ot Jpan's
large imports of'Amerioan ~v,iation gasoline, is that Japan
has singled out tor and subjected to discriminatory treat-
ment. Accordingl~, the Japanese Ambassador records the
Japanese Government's reservation of'rights and its pro-
tests against the policy of' the Government ot the United
states involved in the action under reference.
The Government of the United States desires to state
that the action under reterenoe, as was mentioned in the
proclamation issued by the President ot.the United states
on July 26, 1940, referred to in the Japanese FGbassy's
note under ~cknowledgement, is necessary in the interest
ot the national defense and that.8ccordingly,th1s Govern-
ment considers.s protest by any foreign government a-
gainst that action to be unwarranted.79
77. Langer,Oi.c~. p.18; see also Feis,o~.cit.pp.96-99
78. Foreign ~la~ions of the.Uni1!~StatesLJapan.II,218-t
79. !bld.pp.2l9-220
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And the United states continued this dual attitude until,
on August 27, 1940, the White House found a solution to help
Great Britain, and confidence emerged that Britain would be
able to win Britain's war and to hold its position in the
Far East. From September on, the policy of the United States
against JapQn became more and more precise.80
The tragedy ot Indochina also underwent a change: from
August 30, 1940, Vichy withdrew to the background, while
Hanoi came to the tore, with Vice-Admiral Decoux and General
Nishihara as the main actors.
80. HUll, op.cit., I,838
The United States and Indochina in
The First Indochinese Crisis.
June-September 1940
The Japanese Activities
July and August -1940
The week of July 19, ~940 to July 26, 1940 was a time of
gr~at plaaning in foreign policy for Japan, tor Indochina, and
even for the United states. Eaoh country acted independently,
but the deoision of the one toached the very security of the
other. When the Frenoh agreed between themselves to check the
advance ot Japan, the Japanese authorities were discussing
plans for stronger m.aSQres against French Indochina. And
while, 'by these measures, the Japanese thought ef making their
empire economically independent of the United states, the
latter brought home the fact that it was not. But beoause th
United States moved slowly" though steadily to oppose Japan,
the Japanese Government.oould realize its program of ocoupying
Indoohina. Atterthe' n1nspectorate~1 obtained late in June, as
we have seen, the Japanese succeeded in bUllying the French
into complete acceptaace of their demands at the end of August,
1940.
? ~
1. ~ magazine, revie'W1,ag the situation of Indochin.a
duribgthemonth ot June,1940, has oalled the oondition Japan
had imposed on Indochina an "inspectorate". J~ly 8,1940,XXIV,3Q.
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On August 31, in a telegram to the French Government,
the Governor General still firmly maintained that "a laading,
pretending to be peacefa~ by these troops would destroy the
only chance which is left to us to save the oolony", and that
"if we have to run the risk of losing Indochina, it is better
to lose by defending it rather tbanby betraying".2 Unfor-
tunately, that same day he received trom Vichy th~ notifica-
tion or a political agreement concluded in Tokyo; this was
an agreement concerning which Nishihara lJ,adspoken to him
the day before.
In fact, on August 30, 1940, the head of the Japanese
military mission had presented him the text of a military
agreement, demanding that it be acc~pted by SePtember 2
(midnight) at the latest. Tbe text was already prOVided
With the signature of the Japanese General. In reply to
sueh an action, Vice-Admiral :f)eeo~ said only that he need ...
ed instructions trom his Government at Vichy.3 Whereupon,
with a threatening mood, General Nishihara told the French
Governor G6neral "to stop _leaping, to $~t busy or take
the consequences.,,4
By no means1ntimldated, Vice-Admiral Deeoux called a
~eeting ot the Counell of Government tor September 2. The
2. De~pux,op.ci~., p.102
3. Ibid., p.103
4. §eport of Nicholson to S'eoretary Morgenthau,Sept.21,
lj40.(Morsenthau_Diar1e$~.S. Vol.308,Pp.239tt)as qaoted in
langer, The Undeclared War, p.13 - On September 12, 1940 it
is reported tha£;when at iidnight General Issaku ~lshihara
called on Deooux with the ~apanese demands, the latter,who was
in bed,replied: I ~ a0t getting up. It the Japanese want to
declare war, they can do it tomorrow morning.The New.York Times
Sept.12,1940,P.10
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The meeting actually took place on that day, and the Council
backed ap his position. In the words ot the Governor General -
I found, in the Council, a unanimous appro~al ot
my stand, the general opinion ot the members being that
Indo~hina should not 71eld to threats. nor renounce in-
despensable guarantees. The Council estimated. however.
that it must avoid by all means an abrupt break WithJapan. f)
Furthermore, General Ma~rice Martin, the Supreme Command-
er of the Frenoh Colonial Forces, assur~d Decoux that with the
troops under his oommand he should be able"to keep at bay. on
the Tonkinese trontier, aggressive forces amo~ting even to
three divisions and tor several weeks.6
With these supports, Vice-Admiral Deeoux, on the evening
ot September 2, 19~O, rejected the Japanese ultimatum. while
admitting the principle ot an immediate beginning of nego-
tiations as proYided in the aecord at August 29. 7
Later that night, a telegram trom Vichy came to h~. It
was complex in character but with a mere conciliatory tone.
The French Government iatar-med him' ot an accord given to the
Chinese diplomat, we~lington Koo. that Chinese troops could
cross the Indochinese borders in case ot a Japanese invasion
ot Indochina. Then the 'following directives were indicated:
1. With res~ect to the Chinese. Two eases to beconsidered: . t----
a) If Chinese troops penetrate into Indochina
before any Franco-Japanese military accord: to op])ose
this penetration;
5. Deeoux.op.cit:. p.104
6 • Lac. 01t • _"'')C: ~., :_~ " :. '"
7 • Garoon; op. cie , n;~.,62'-
89
b) If Chinese troops penetrate into Indochina
as sequel to a Franco-Japanese military accord per-
mitting regular Japanese forces to enter the terri-
tory: to retreat while keeping contact with them but
to stand aside fram any fighting which might oceur
between the Chinese and the J~panese. The extreme
l~it of the retreat must permit the French troops to
bar the Chine$e from reaching the delta.
Z. With resE-eetto th!...JaEane!!. Two cases
also to be consIdered:
8) It the J8paneseseek to disembark or to pen-
etrate into Indoch~n8 before any accord had been con-
cluded on the subject between the F~encb and Japanese
authorities; to oppose this action by tOrce;
b) If the Japanese troops penetrate into Indochina
in pursuance of a Franco-Japanese aecord: to comply
with the clauses of the accord, permitting the Japanese
to ase roads, etc., without abantoning the def~nse of
anyone ot the places or establishments Which possess
Tital importance in the militaryview.8
~hese details greatly annoy~d the Governor General ot
Indochina. He informed Vichy, .t once, that he would use
torce against any aggression.9
On his part, General Nishihara was disconcerted by the
attitude ot Decoux. A little atter midnight on September 2,
1940, he withdrew his ultimatum and intormed the Vice-Admiral
that he was willing to open. negotiations. He added,how~ver.
that is satisfactory terms could not be arrived at, the
Japanese troops would advance into Indoohina on September 5,
1940.10
On September 4, General Nishihara ordered General T.Suzuki
8.
9.details
10.
Deeoux.op.cit., p.lOe
General Max~e Weygand disdainfully called these
"pap tor catsft•
Decoux,op.cit., p.107
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to evacuate the Japanese nationals trom Hanoi as though war
was imminent. But. agreements were reached. These were known
as "basic accord ot September 4, 1940". General Martin, be-
tore signing this preliminary dQc~ent, had added to it im-
portant observations. He requeste~ tbat to the degree that the
tinal convention should not have been attended. and the date
of the entry into force ot that convention should not have
been fixed, the Japanese land, naval and a.rial forces could
not advance into Indochinese territory and waters. He also
ruled out any act susceptible ot being construed as pressure
and said that he would consider as an act Of pressure any
attempt on the part of the Japane~e to oross the frontier,
any concentration of Japanese troops near the Indochinese
frontier, any actiVity of th$ JapaneeeNavy off the IndO-
chinese coests and any flight over Indochinese territory. In
conclusion, the accord reads:
In ease 'the above-.entione<l conditions should
not be respected by the Japanes8'forces, the French
military co~and would be authorized to break the en-
gaged negotiations and to resume its freedom of aetion.ll
The intention of the Frenoh authorities, when they in-
serted these. conditions in t.berel1minary accori, was not only
to check the Japanese threat ~f invasion, bat also ta delay as
long as possible the final agreement. tor, despite the etforts
at the American Government to avoid holding, out hope of armed
assistance to Indochina. the Frenoh still did not give up the
ll.Deeoux, op.cit. p.107
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- the idea that eventually some help might oome from the United
States to fight against Japan.12
In spite of the french precaution, on the night of Sep-
tember 5-6, 1940, a Japanese batta~ion crossed the Indochinese
border near Langsom and ocoupied the hills ot Dong-dang. Im-
mediately, Deoonx declared that the Accord of September 4 was
violated and brake otf nesotiations.13
On September 7, General Nishihara hurried to the Palace
of the Governor General to present excuses. He explained that
the inoident was the result of an error otmanoeuvre and or-
dered the Japanese battalion to withdraw at once. But the neg-
otiations remained at a standstill until September 13, when
Decoux made it known t.at he had received instructions to re-
14sume them.
The Unit~d States was not informed ot the Franco-Japanese
political agreement ot August 29, until September 5, 1940 at
the time of the Japanese pressure exerted in Langson.15 During
that time the American foreign policy continued its regular
way. On September 1, .Ambassador Grew wrote:
American-Japanese relations are marking ttme. In
a recent tnstruction I saw indications that our G0vern-
ment may be getting ready to show its teeth, an instruc-
tion WhiCh I hiShly applauded. O~tright invasion ot
-
'12. ~n Septembe~ 12, 1940, it was ~eported that Deeoux
hed sent three telegrams to President Roosevelt to ask tor
help. The New York Ttftes, September 12. 1940
13; IMtft, Record; p.6930, as cited in Jones,op.cit.p.229
14. Loc.cit.
15. HU11.=02.cit., 1,903
92
French Indochina has been held in check in spite of
military pressure, but if it should become evident
that Germany is going to win the "battle of Britain"
I woald look for an early move not only on Indochina
but likewise in Hong-kong and probably, eventually,
the Netherlands East Indies. 16
Two days later, he received instruotion from the Secre-
tary of State to Call Matsuoka's attention to the fact that
within the past few days reports from several souroes had
oome to the Department of State,
to the etfect that the Gover~ent of Japan has pre-
sented an ultimatum to the French authorities in
Indochina on Japan's demands tor permission to Jap-
anese armed torces, for parposes of military oper-
ations against China, to pasa through French terri-
tory and to use military bases and other facilities.
The Secretary of State added that the American Govern-
ment "wishes to point ou~ the unfortunate effect on American
public opinion from ~ne point of view of Japanese-Amerioan
relations if these repGrts prove to be correct". He also
wanted Matsuoka to be ~eminded that, according to the press,
the Japanese Foreign Office had said on June 19, 1940 "that
Japan attaohed importance to maintaining the status guo in
Fr~neh Indochina."l?
The next day. September 4, 1940, in response to in-
qUiries by press correspondents, Hull repeated publicly what
he had instructed Ambassador Grew point by point. emphasizing
the fact that "should events prove these reports to have been
11. Grew, ~~n Years in Ja~~n.p. 326
1'1. JJ.:orel~R~la!tlons of' the ID;!itedStates.Japa!!, II,29l~2. HUll. op.cit., I,903
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well founded, the effect upon public opinion 1n the United
States would be unfortunate.ft16
In tact, the development of events in Indochina had
stirred up anti-imperialistic feelings and the concern over
the long-range home security of the American people; more
consideration was centered on the possibility of an imminent
Japanese invasion of Indochina and its consequenoes. On SeP-
tember 5, 1940, under the title "Threat to Indochina", the
New York ~im!a editorially showed the seriousness of the
situation:
Japanese invasion would, for one thing, have a
serious effect upon the war in China, Which now keeps
Japan so deeply involved that it actS' as a measure of
insuranCe for the British at Singapore, the Dutch in
the East Indies, ourselves in the Philippines. China's
capacity for resistance has been impaired already by
Japanese blockading activity on the coast of Indochina.
It,will be reduoed still further, if the present triokle
of arms through Indochina 1s stopped altogether, and if
the Southern Chinese armies should be threatened with a
Japanese encirolement from French soil on the South.
An invasion of Indochina would be serious too in
giving the Japanese a stranglehold on neighboring Siam
where their influence has been increasing during re-
cent years. And this, in turn, would affect the safety
of Signapore, Which may yet be menaced from its hinter-
land as Gibraltar has been menaced by German-Italian
penetration of Spain. The Whole status~uo in Eastern
Asia ~ould be upset by a Japanese+move 1nto Indochina,
tor such a move would ~e a precedent and an entering
wedge for further Japanese depredations elsewhere. If
the Facific s~atus guo means anything to the United
States, our GOvernment and people will do well to keep
--- -_.
18. Department ot State BUlletin, (Sept.7.l940),III,196
The same day, Prince KOnoye,Matsuoka,the Ministers of War
and Navy decided that Japan's Sphere of Living would comprise
the Whole ot Southeast Asia .•Langer, The Undeclared War,p.25
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their eyes upon the developments of the next few days
in distant Indochina.19
As tor public opinion, there was a growing opposition
to the conduct of Japan. According to the Gallup poll, on
August 3, 1940, the proportion ot people willing to risk war
"to keep Japan from beooming more powerful" was 51 per oent,
with 31 per. oent opposing and +8 per oent undecided. On
September 7, however, to the same question, the Rros had risen
to 70 per cent and the qons fallen to 18 per cent, others
being undecided.
On September 11, Seoretary Hull disoussed the agreement
Franoe had signed with Japan on August 29, with the new Frenoh
Ambassador, Gaston Henry-Haye. The Seoretary remarked that
the French Government "oannot imagine our surprise and our
disappoin~ent When it took this step without any notice What-
ever to us". He was told, however, that Japan had given as-
suranoe that the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina
would be merely temporary. The Frenoh als~ solicited the
. 20United States to seek trom Japan'the same assurance.
In answering this request, the Seoretary expressed again
19. The Hew York Times, September 5, 1940,p.22. About
the ~atus tUO, in November 1937, Prinoe Konoye had deolared
before the talian good-will mission: "I oannot but feel that
at this present time, when the negative prinoiple of maintenance
ot the status guo, built up atter the last World War, has tor-
teited Its funotion as a result ot •••confliots and contradictions
the responsibility tor the creation ot peace devolves on three
powers,Italy,Germany and Japan."
20. HUll, 02.cit., 1,904
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to Vichy his surprise to learn of the extent of the French
concessions to Japan and pointed out that there was little
warrant for entering into agreements which assented to a de-
rogation of principles. WWe deprecated", Hull said.
France's recognition ot Japan's claLm to a prepond-
erance of interests and a preferred eoonomic position
in Indochina and ot Japan's violation of French and
other rights and interests. As for asking Japan tor
assuranoes similar to those given to France, I said
we perceived no reason to associate ourselves with
an assent to an unlawtul procedure by asking tor suoh
assurances. Moreover, What value could anyone giveSQoh assuranoes? 21
To these discreet representations of the American Gov-
ernment, the French Foreign Oftice replied the next day
saying that the political agreement of ~ugust 29, 1940, was
negotiated under constant threat of an ultimatwn, and that
in the present negotiations at Hanoi, etforts were being
made to limit the conceSSions demanded by Japan. The Frenoh
then begged the Secretary to understand their situation and
asked the Government at Washington to maintain its position
in regard to the status guo in East Asia.22
Also on September 12, 1940, Ambassador Grew sent to
Washington a most important telegram, ot which he said that
"a magnum opus tinally went ott to the Department today in
a message ot more than twelve pages". It was a general anal-
ysis of the Japanese situation and the truit o~ Grew's thoughts
during the tifty days since the new Government took office in
21. Hull, ep.clt., 1,904
22. Charl~s::Roux, op.clt., p.259
Japan.23
This telegram was considered as a "green light" allow-
ing the Department of State to take stronger and more et-
fective measures against Japan. In tact, it marked a new
stand of the American Ambassador in Tokyo. Grew himself
confessed th.at:
In previous communicatiGns, I have expressed the
opinion that sanctions by the United States would set
Japanese-American relations on a downward curve. It
is true that our own neWly instituted program ot
national preparedness now justifies measures Which
need not fall within the realm of outright sanctions.
On the other hand we must enVisage the probability that
drastic embargoes on the ~port ot suoh important pro-
ducts as petroleum, of Which the United states is known
to possess a superabundance would be interpreted by the
J panesa Government and people as aotually sanctions
~:i~:t~~~~4and prObably would lead to some torm of re-
But the situation in Japan changed fast, and Grew had
reached the conclusion that such steps beoame vitally nec-
essary to preserve the !tatus gU0 in the Pacific. He under-
took, then, to describe the hazards whioh could be involved
"in a 1aissez-taira pGlicy". His reason now waB that the
United States and Great Britain were the leaders of the Eng-
lish speaking nations around the world, which were threatened
today by Germany, Italy, Soviet Bussia and Japan •••a group ot
dictatorial powers. The United States and Great Britain oould
not deal with these powers by the use ot diplomaoy, beoause
diplomaoy might oocasionally retard but oould not effectively
23. Grew, Tyrbulent EraLA Di210matic Record of Forty_Years1904-1945,11,1225
24. Grew, Turbttlent Era, p.1224
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stem the tide. To deal with them, force or display of
force alone could attain some result. This firm policy
was particularly needed toward Japan which became a pre-
datory power. And Grew analysed: Japan had submerged all
moral and ethical sense, she had become frankly and un-
ashamedly opportunist, she had sought at every turn to
profit by the wea~ness of others, and her policy of south-
ward expansion was a definite threat to American interests
in the Paoific and a thrust at the British Empire in the
East. In conclusion, the important telegram read:
American security has admittedly depended in a
measure upon the existence of the British fleet which
in turn has be6n, a~d could only have been, supportedby the British lmpire.
It We conoeive it to be in our interest to sup-
port the British Empire in this hou~ of her travail;and I most emphatically do so conceive it, we must
strive by every means to preserve the status guo in
the Pacific at least until the European war fias-been
won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor
can our interests ~e further adequately and properly
protected by merely registering disapproval and keep-
ing a Oareful reoord thereot. It is clear that Japan
has been d$terred from taking greater liberties with
American interests only out ot respect for our poten-
tial power; it is equally Olear that she has trampled
upon o~r rights to a degree in precise ratio to the
strength at her conviction that the American people
would not per~it that power to b$ used. OnCe that
conviction is shaken it is possible that the uaes
Qf diplomacy may again become accepted. 25
Later, Ambassador Grew proudly and also gratefally
noted that his message of September 12 aimed to present
"What the DepartmentW!:ter good enough to characterize as
"25. Grew, Turbulent Era a pp.1224-9
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26a 'cogent argument and penetrating analysis'".
The Secretary of State then reviewed once his policy
in the light of Grew's message and found that the policy
followed by the President and himself had long since travel-
ed well beyond the use of words to express disapproval of
Sapan's actions. In fact, the American Government had ab-
rogated the commercial treaty of 1911 with Japan, imposed
moral embargoes, legal embargoes, undertaken a vast pro-
gram of rearmament, maintained the fleet at Pearl Harbor,
and assisted in various ways the Government of Chiang Kai-
shek. Hull cited also some effects ot his ffp01icy of firm-
ness" on the situatio~ at Indochina and said:
The Japanese Army's original intentions toward
Frenoh In~oohina had involved a wnolesale invasion ot,
the colonY. Grew indieat$d in his cable that the Jap-
anese Government had been able, at least temporarily,
to restrain the military trom these plans, and attribut-
ed this "degree ot caution" ~t least partly to the pos-ition ;of the United States.27
26. Grew,Turbulent Era, p.1230. Testifying in 1945 be-
fore the CongreiiIOnallnvestigation ot the Pearl Harbor At-
tack, Grew summarized as tollows the reason of his reversal
of position: "The Japanese Army was steadily encroaching
further into t~e Far East art4 in~o East Asia. They were po-
tentially threatening our vital interests. And from that
point or view the situation had very much changed iadeed.
That, I think, was the main rea~on why I sent that telegram,
but one must remember that ~1 so-called greenlight telegram
was not something Which had developed in a question of a
tew hours or a few days. It meant a progressive line at
thinking over a periodto the crux of the sitnationn• 79th
Cong. Pearl Harbor Attack. 1st Secs.,Part 2,p.638
27. HUll, o~.cit., 1,905
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This position of the United States was streftgthened. on
the same September 12. 1940. by more restrictions on American
exports. Objections had long delayed these measures. but
events in Indochina were judged serious enough to allow them.
On September 10. in preparation tor the proclamation con-
cerning regulations. the Secretary ot State had instructed Am-
bassador Grew to state to the Japanese Foreign Office that it
Japan continued to violate 4meriean rights. the United states
might be compelled to take measures of defense. Hull's tele-
gram argued that if the United States must take positive mea-
sures tor self-defense in its relations with Japan. such retal-
iatory measures would be amply warranted and would have been
brought about by Japanese disregard. "Persistent and continued",
28of the rights of the United States.
The way thus haVing been cleared. on September 12. 1940.
the United States determined that it was necessary to the
national defense "that on and after this date the following-
described articles and materials shall not be exported from
the United States except when authorized in each case by a
license". These articles and materials were eqUipment for
production ot aviation motor tuel from petroleum, petroleum
products, hYdrocarbons or hydrocarbon mixtures by process
involving ohemical change, equipment tor production ot tetra-
ethyl lead; they included also any plans, specifications or
•28 •. Telegram to Grew. September 10. 1940. cited byLanger, The Undeclared War, p.19
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or other documents containing desoriptive or technical inform-
ation of any kind useful in any design, construction or opera-
tion of any such equipment of aircraft or aircraft engines.29
These new measures were soon justified by new proof of
Japanese disregard toward the United states. In the words of
Cordell HUll, we read:
A good indication of the attitude of the KanoY'e
Government toward us came two days later when the
Foreign Office handed Grew a reply to the representations
we had made concerning French Indochina on August 7. The
r~ply was written in pencil. It admitted that negotia-
tions had been carried on with the French Indochinese
authorities, but gave no details. It asserted that Japan
had been making efforts not to bring about undesirable
changes in the status guo in the Pacific, in so far as
the status quo did not Interfere with "the firm preserva-
tion of the minimwn right,to existence". 30
Secretary Hull remarked at onoe that the restriction - "in
so far as the status SY2 did not interfere with 'the firm pre-
serv~tian of a minimum right to existence'" - was a serious
challenge to the.~atus gq£. This challenge appeared in a clear-
er light in the text ot the Japanese answer, in which it was
pretended that the ~perial Government, because of the need to
construct a hew order iU East Asia, had, therefore, carried out
negotiations with regard to French Indochina, and on that basis
29. ~oreisn Relation$~f the Un1tedStat~~,Japan,II 220-1
30 •. ull, 02.c1t., :r,90~On September 3, Secretary Hull had
instructed Grew to make representations on the same subject (See
above,p.93) But "the Vice-Minister denied that he knew anything
about an~lt1matum", he denied not, however, "that armed forces
of Japan did intend to seek passage through French Indochina.
Ohashi said that the Japane e intention was a matter of military
necessity; that there would be no permanent occupation of French
territory; and that Japan would withdraw the foroes in question
as soon as the military necessity oeased to exist". Foreisa
Relations of_~he Ya!~ed §ta~es,Japan, II 292-3
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had continued progressively with satisfactory looal negotia-
tions. Then the answer said:
Under the ever-changing conditions of today, past
rules and norms rapidly become inapplicable to actual
conditions. It is clear that, merely to adhere blindly
to such rules and norms is not the way to stabilize
world peace. Despite the fact that in the western hem-
isphere epoch-making changes are actually being made in
the status_g~, Japan has as yet expressed no opinion
tor or against t~ose changes. It has to be pointed out
'that intrusion by the United States in an area which is
so remote trom that country as in this case brings about
the same e~fect upon Japan's public opinion as tbe meddle-
some attitude of a third country toward the policy of
the United States concerning third-power territories in
western hemisphere would bring upon public opinion inthe United States.3l
The philosophy underlying t~e Japanese foreign policy was
that the status guo could not be any more applicable in pre-
sent conditions. Moreover. the penCiled "oral state~ent" hint-
ed that the United States itself had violated the !tatus guo in
thewestern hemisphere, pointing to the American deal with British
32Newfoundland.
Secretary Hull acu.tely perceived the tone of insult in that
oommunication and was t~iDking of al strong reply. Meantlm.~ he
took a cautious cou~se.
On September 16, 1940, Lord Lothian suggested that the
United States should take ~s0me steps that would deter Japan
from oocuRying Indochinaft• The Secretary of State showed him
the difficulty of giving support to such remote oountries. He
sai~ that tbe United States had gone almost "to the limit in
...
31. Foreign RIlat10ns ot the United States,Japan,II.293-4
32. Hull, £!.eit., 1,836-8
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resisting Japanese aggression step by step without running
t~e very serious danger of a military elash". His idea was
to encourage Indochina "to delay and parley and hold out to
the last minute against Japanese demands .e tt He expressed also
t~e hope that Japan would not dare make a military attack at
33this time. .
The French. on their part, had another occasion to prove
that they were following the adviees ot the Secretary of State.
Under pretext that Japan was baking Thailand in the aggressive
attitude Which the latter was manifesting on the Indochinese
borders since the beginning of September. the French Ambassa-
dor in Tokyo threatened to 4elay the conclusion of Franco-
Japahese negotlatio~s.34 But this menace was immediately neu-
tralized by a Japanese counter-threat of using torce.35
On September 17. 1940. however. Viee'·Admiral Decoux noted
a new t-endeney in the Japanese p6sition which he thought favor-
able to Freneh interest$. Up to that date. the Japanese author-
ities invoked. as major argument tor the transit of Japanese
troops throngh Indochina. the need they felt to engage at onee
in military operations against Yunnan. Now they recognized the
cogency of the technical o~ject1onsbrought forth by the French
against sucb an undertaking. end declared that they were ready
to give up the idea. But they reclaimed the entry of Japanese
torces into Tonkin. Decoux did not like to see the negotiations
reach a conclusion on this'point, always expecting that "an
- -33. Hull. 02.eit~. 1.906
S4. Decoux.~.cit ••pp.133-4
35. IMTFE. Re£ors. pp.6931-2.as cited in Jones.o~.clt.p.299
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American intervention would come in time, and that a powerful
veto of the Washington Government would finally oppose the
Japanese pretentions~. He added that, to this effeot, he kept
the American consul at Hanoi exactly informed of the situatio~~
The policy of buying time practiced by the French author-
itiesexasperated the Japanese. On September 19, 1940, they
made it known to .Arsene-Henry and .Deeoux thet the Imperial Army
would enter Indochina on S$pt~ber 22, whether the military
cOBvention would have been concluded or not.57
Cornered to the final phase, the French authorities, on
the followiag day, agreed to a compromise, which c.omprised
these, essential elements:
1. Utilization ot tour (or five) air bases in Tonkin;
2. L~itation to 6,000 Japanese troops to be station-
ed in Indochin(i;
3. Retreat through Tonkin of a part of the Japanese
troops now in ditficulty in Kwangsi;
4. Landing, on the night ot September 22-25 of tirst
Japanese elements in the port of Hai-phong;
5. Because the Japanese Chief of Staff does not con-
template any more ground operations against China until
new orders, temporary renouncement to the entry of the
25,000 troops provided tor that eventuality. 3e
In this junoture, the Japanese presented to the French
tresh demands. They pretended that the landing of 6,000 troops
at Hai-phong and the crossing of 25,000 troops from Canton
through Tonkin would operate simultaneously. They asked also
that a Japanese Headquarters would ~e set UP at Hanoi and a
hospital tor the 1apanese troops would be provided. The French
- -=
36. Decoux, op.cit., p.al
37. Ibid., P. 100
38. ~,P. 111
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considered the demands unacceptable. 39
There were critical moments. The Japanese militarists
were thinking that Japan could not ever hope to afford the
monumental expenditures for navy, army and air foree that
America had been appropriating and that, therefore, Japan
must strike quickly to attain all its ends before the Amer-
ican prepare4ness program waS. well advanced. "This radical
clique believes that America can now be defied with impunity
and 8rsues that Amerioa will not accept Japan's challenge as
40
long as Britain so urgently needs American-made war materials."
So, in a threatening mOOd, the Japanese authorities left Hanoi
and boarded a warship in the Gulf of Tonkin, as war was 1m-
mtent. Only Gene.ral Nishihara stayed in a hotel at Hai-phong.
On September ~l, 1940, the Japanese Navy sta~ed a big demon-
stration. iut, finally, the Japanese as well as the French,
did not want a fatal break, the tormer tor fear of the UAited
States, and the latter because they were unable to fight alone
against J"apsIl.4l
Consequently, on September 22,1940, in the afternoon,the
Franco-Japanese negotiations resumed. At 3 P.M., General Nish-
39. ~he French Delegation to tbeFraneo-German Armistice
commission told General von Stuelpnagel, head at the German
Delegation, that the Japanese demanded the permanent stationing
ot 32,000 troops in Indoohina. IM'rFE,Record,p.6790, as oited
in Jones, Q~.ci~., p.230
40. t§eeoux,O;e.oit., p.112
41. Devillers,02.e1!.,p.77
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lhara at Bai-phong signed th t xt ot a illtary oonv n ion
which was 8 nt him·trom Hanoi ith th signature ot General
Martin. The prinoipal clauses ot the MartiQ-Ni hih r eon-
vention ere:
1. Right ot the Japanese rmy to use three air
bases in Tonkin.
2. Right of the Japanese command to st tion 6,000
troop in the North of the Red River;
3. Possibility ot an ntual oros ing through Ton-
kin ot Japanese toroes going to operat in the direction
ot Yunnan. Tbe total amount ot troops stationed in Indo-
china hould not be in any case over 25,000 at the same
time.
4. Passage through the Tonkines d lta, tor the r -
embarcation, ot the battalion ot Canton now ooncentrated
at th trontier. This movement, howey r, can b und r-
taken, by the terms ot the coord, only tter a peoia1
rrang ment which will regUlate th p1 n ot tr nsportatio
ot the torce in qu stion. 42
The text showed c1 arly the surrender ot the Fr nchuth.
oriti s to the Japanese menace. But the Indochine • Government,
in nnouncing the agreem nt by proclamation, said it granted
the Japanese only "certain tacilities ot a military natur
.ithout turther delay", in exchang tor Japanes guarantees
to respect the territorial integrity and French sovereignty
ot Indochina. Decoux said that the agreament represented "one
ot the greatest marks of oonfidenoe one country can give
another". And General Maurice Martin who signed the conventio
termed it "the first manitestation ot a durable triendship be-
tween Franee and Japan". 43
42. Decoux, op.cit., p.112
43. San Francisco Examln!£, September 23, 1940, p.l
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The friendship between the two countries,however, proved
to be quite precarious. The battalion or CantoD, mentioned in
the convention, knew of the ultimatum of September 19, 1940, and
was eager to invade Langson. Right after the conolusion of the
convention, in orde~ to prevent any accident, General Nishihara
had sent an emissary to Langson to inform the Japanese battalion
of the news and also of the restriction concerning its passage
through Tonkin. The emissary got there on time. But the officers
commanding the Japanese troop di4 not want to receive him. They
carried out, at 10 P.M. that night, an attaok on the French out-
post at Dong-dang near Langson. Suddenly,~ance and Japan were
at war. 44
Vice-Admiral Deooux had confidence in the French torce. Ao-
cording to the report given him by the Supreme Commander,Frenoh
troops at Langson could tight Victoriously not only against one
but three Japanese battalions. Soon, however, oame the truth.
The French, atter heavy dereats, sought and obtained an armi-
stice at 8 P.M. on September 25, 1940.45
But the victo~s 01' the battl~ of Dong-dang were not happy,
either. American pUDlic opinion turned strongly against them.
Already on September 24, the New_York T!ie§ had denounced Japan
in an editorial. It said that Dong-dang was a signpost along
a new road of conq~est whioh Japan may regret advertising to
+
44. Gaudel, op.cit., pp.85-8
45. Deooux, 2R..crt., pp 114-0; Devillers,oR.oit.,p.78
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the world in this violent tashion. Then it declared:
Once more it appears that an unbridled young mil-
itary oligarchy - the Japanese Nazis - defied the Gov-
ernment this time to follow the example of Russia and
Italy in striking a onoe powerful neighbor when he is
down. But in violating the territory of Indoohina by
toroe, while the Frenoh put up unexpected resistanoe,
Japan not only takes a deoisive step beyond the oonfines
of China. She runs into the opposition 01' the United
States; expressed by Seoretary Hull yesterday, and applies
what may turn out to be the tinal pressure to expedite theconolusion 01' an agreement between this oountry and Great
Britain tor the Joint use of naval bases in the Paoitio.46
In taot, On SePtember 23, 1940, Secretary HUll, atter
reoeiving the text 01' the Martin-Nishihara oonvention, had
stated:
Events are transpiring so rapidly in the Indoohina
situation that it is ~possible to get a olear pioture
01' the minute-to-minute development. It seems obvious,
however, that the status ~uo is being upset under duress.
The position 01' the ~nrte States in disapproval and in
deprecation 01' such prooedures had repeatedly been stated.47
The San Ftanois~_Chronicle was n0t content with this
attitude ot the Amerioan Government. On September 25, 1940,
it indignantly announced:
The State Department at Washington is preserving
an angry silence beoause America is too weak to declare
war and protests are regarded in Tokyo as merely an add-
ed indication of weakness it they are not supported ytorce. 48
But the stand 01' the United States against Japan in the
second halt 01' September,1940, was not that 01' weakness. Al-
ready on the 19th, at the news or the Japanese ult~atum to
46.
47.
48.
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the French. Secretary Hull had instructed Ambassador Grew
to inform the Japanese Minister tor Foreign A:f'tairsof the
report and to express to him the great surprise of the Amer-
ican Government that "the Japanese authorities in French Indo-
china should have taken action giving rise to this report." 49
On September 20. 1940. Ambassador Grew acted upon the in-
structions of the State Department. Tpe Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs agreed that the report was correct. except tor
some minor pGints. He explained that the Governor General of
Indochina. ready to si&n an agreement on September 6, 1940. r~·
fused afterward to do it for reasons not evident to the Japanese
Government. Whereupon. the Japanese Gover~ent. i~quiring of
the French Government the Qause ot that uncooperativeness.found
that the Governor General was .l}otacting in good faith. The
latter. moreover. had boasted to the foreign Consuls stationed
in Hanoi that he was using obstructive tactics. For that reason.
the Japanese Government had presented the ultimatum.
~he Foreign Minister repeated also what h~ said many times
before, namely that the measures ta~en were designed to enable
Japan to attack Chiang ....Kai-shek. and that the Japanese. as soon
as the hostilities have ceased .ould withdraw at once from IndO-
china. Japan also would respect the integrity and sovereignty
of Indochina, anq there would be no interference in the sta~u!
9,uo 01' East Asia.
49. Forei§n Relations ot the United States.Japan 11.294
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Finally, Matsuoka did not object to the idea that there
were economio olauses in the agreement, but gave assuranoes
that exploitation would Dot ensue. He still confidentially
told Ambassador Grew that a request was first made by France
tor a renewal of guarantees pertaining to the integrity of
Indochina, and therefore, "permission had been asked by Japan
tor the move~ent of forces aoross Indochina and for the use
temporarily ot airports as 'compensation' tor complying with
. 50the Frencb request."
In this oocasion, Ambassador Grew presented to the Min-
ister the text ot the reply of the Secretary of State to the
"oral statement" of September 14, 1940, of the Japanese Gov-
ernment. The most telling passage of the reply was:
It is the opinion of my Government that the statusSf2 of a third country is serlonslY8tfected when oneo the two countries which is engaged in hostilities
with another insists, in order to attack the other,upon
the right of the use of airdromes and tne right ot pass-
age for troops through the third country. In the light
ot the Japanese Government's announced desire that thest!tus guo be maintained in the Pacific area there ap-pears to De an inoonsistency in oonnection with the stip-
ulations of this nature which. are being made upon the
authorities in Indoc~ina by the Japanese Government. 51
That same day, September 2@, 1940, Under-Secretary Welles,
referring to the Japanese activities in In~oohina, sharply re-
minded the Japanese Ambassador in waShington that "the United
States woul~ ••_.te&l it neoessary to furnish such means ot as-
sistance in the way of supplies,munitions,etc_, for these vic-
"'-,$
',~;...
50. Gr~'4'fen .~&ra .• ;<il8E!!h pp. 330-25l.i" Fore.ign Re a:t'ions.o't the United States,Ja~an,II,296-7
. - _ ~.4
,~ .
110
52
ttms of ggression in the Pacific area as might be required."
The American Government received the text of the Martin-
Nishihara convention on September 22, 1940. In this connection,
Secretary Hull made the long resounding statement mentioned ear-
lier. And because the French Government announced that the
United States had approved the political Franco-Japanese agree-
ment of August 29, the State Department, in aprees release on
September 23, after citing HUll's statement, added:
This Government has not at any time or in any
way approved the French concessions to Japan. The
attitude of this Government toward developments in
French Indochina is as expressed by the Secretary 53
of State this morning and in preVious publio statements.
The highhanded oourse of Japan in Indochina really "rais-
ed the temperature in Wasnington".54 On the same September 23
the so-called Liaison Oommittee, of Which Under-Secretary Welles
was a member, considered the problem of providing arms to Indo-
55 .china, if Only a few rifles. About this move to aid Indo-
chins, the ~aa F~ancisc02at2al~1!, on September 26, announced
on its front page:
In a decision ot diplomatic drama, loaded with tar-
reaching consequences, the Roosevelt Administr$tion mGved
today to extend its policy to "all aid short of war" tostiffen Indochina's resistance to J~panese aggression.
At the present moment, Indochina's representative in Wash-
ington, Golonel H. Jacomy, is flying the 10,000 miles air
route tro~ the White House to his ~noi headquarters,with
the hot news he has received trom the New Deal spokesmen.56
tt, atterward, Washington decided asainat selling arms and
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
•Foreisa Relations ~ thetunited staies.Jap!B, 1,881Ibid., II,2 7; aU!l op.c i., I.g07
%iIi T·~~.,l~, Langer,The Undeclared Wa!:,p.20rsra.: p.15
San Fr!a2!!co Caroniole,Sept.26,lg40. p.i
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munitions, it was partly because the American preparedness was
still at its beginning, partly because the United states was
57afraid that the American aid might go over to the Japanese.
On September 25, 1940, other concrete measures were under-
taken against Japan. The Administration made it public that,
"to assist China to meet her present foreign exchange needs,the
Import-Export Bank has agreed to lend China $25,000,000 that
58will be liquidated through the sale of the tungsten."
That day, news was abroad that "8 further tightening of
the Americane.m.ba~go on war materials to Japan 'appears inevi-
table' as a result ot Nipponese torays into Indochina". In
fact, on SePtember 26, the White House proclaimed that more re-
strictions were brought on tbe exportation of iron and steel,
scrap effective October 16, 1940. From that date, "the export-
ation of all grades of iron and steel sCrap will be placed under
the licensing system". 59
Of course, the Japanese were ready to oriticize the firm
policy of the United States. Domei, Japanese-News Agency, with
close connections with the Foreign Office, declared that the
Japanese Army aad Navy were prepared to counter any uncalled-for
intervention by a thir4 power. And Yakichira Suma,Foreign Office
spokesman, aaid that, since the Japanese movement into Indochina
was the result of an agreement in "peaceful talks" no foreign
r.. ""Pl'!9*'
5'7.
58.
59.
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Langer, Tlte Undec!ar$LWar, p.15
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country oould object. Apparently, the spokesman was re-
ferring to the American note presented to the Japanese For-
eign Offioe on September 20, 1940, in which it was stated
that the American Government "urges upon all governments the
employment of peaoeful means o.tU.yin their relationS with all
other regions". 60
Oritioisms of Hull's attitude were heard in the United
states itself. On September 25, 1940, an editorial of the ~
York ~~ilI N!!!, quoted in Congress, ran as tollows:
A sharp statement ~egistering Secretary of state
'Hull's disapproval of Japaa makes United-States-Japanese
relations a little worse than before. This time, Mr.
Hull, WhO, of course, is the Roosevelt A~inistrationts
ofticial mouthpiece in affairs like this, objects toJapan's grab at French Indo-china. . .What moral objection there can be to the grab es-
capes us. France grabbed 1ndochi~a in 1883, atter 30
years of oft-and-on warfare betWeen the natives and
Freneh missionaires backed by French soldiers. ~rance
is n,ow three-fifths oocupied 'by the Germans, and."thegovernment of the other two-fitths 01' France has con-sented to the Japan~se Indoehina grab.
Yet Mr. Hull complains that the Far East "statusguo" is being upset'•••"under duress". What business,uie
that 01' ours? What duty have we to pres.rve the 8~tuS
guo in the Far East? 61
But this isolatienistic view was not shared by the general
pUblic, who wanted the Amer1ean policy to be stronger. General-
ly, it was be11eY~d that "our threats without aotion have play-
ed dir~ctly into ~he ha~ds of the Japanese militarists, as cer-
tainly as aetion without threats would have strengthened the
--------,_._--_._ ....
60. The New York Times, Sept.24, lt40,p.11; loreign R!-
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hands of the ant~ilitarists".62
Furthermore, the new show of strength of the United States
had obtained a quick result. On September 26, 1940, in the even-
ing, just a day atter an armistice was signed on the incident
of Langson, Governor General Decoux received a message trom the
French Ambassador in Tokyo assuring him that the Emperor had
given an order to the Japanese troops to cease all hostilities,
and that General Ando,Commander ot the Army ot Canton would be
relieved trom. his co.n:unand.It was also reported that General
Tominaga, Vice-Minister of War, who bad backed the solution at
Langaon was relieved of his post beoause ot this. 63
Another action showed the setback of the Japanese militar-
ists in Indochina. On October 5, 1940, the Japanese Commander
at Langson gathered the Frenoh and Indochinese soldiers. He
knelt in receiving an Imperial rescript which he brought with
respect to his lips. He oPened the message, and atter addition-
al kneelings, he read it aloud. The text, signed by the Emper-
or himself, said that the incident at Langson was an unexpected
event, an error of manoeuvre, and consequently, had no importance
with respeot to the situation as a w~ole. It declared that the
Japanese troops co~ing trom China must evacuate ~apidly and that
the French sovereignty on Indoohina was incontestable.64
-
62.
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On the other hand, the Japanese tried to prove that their
coming to Indochina was rea11y the consequenoe of an understand-
img between the French and Japanese authorities. To this ettect,
on September 27, 1940, Japan and France announced a joint-commun-
ique, whioh read:
The Japanese Government has given the French Gov-
ernment an assurance they will respect the rights andinterests of France in East Asia, especially the terr-
itorial integrity of 1rench Indochina and the French
Sovereignty over all parts Of the Union,of Indochina,
while the French bave agreed to aecord to the Japanese
Army and Navy speoial facilities in ,Indochina whioh are
necessary tor the execution of the latter's military
operations.
In order to decide upon the ooncrete matters per-taining to the above-mentioned extap.sion of m;Llitaryfacilities, conversations were hSld at Hanoi between
the Japanese and Frep.ch military autho~ities. As a
result of these conversations a satisfactory agreement
was oonoluded ~DSeptember 22. 55
Japan sought elso to consolidate its position vis-a-vis--
the United States. ~hat same day, it ooncluded a Pact with
Germany and Italy, a pact which was a r~alization or the pro-
gram 81'rivedat by the Ja-panese Liaison Conference on July
26 and 27. This was a 'momentous 8chiev~ment on the part of
Gex-many as well as of Japan. !litler and Ribbentrop had made
all their efforts to draw tapan to their side, even before
the European war, but in vain. Each time, when Japan needed
the German help tor its Southward expansion, the question ot
a German-Japanes~ military alliance cue up, but Japan always
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hesitated. RecentlY,on August 10. 1940, reports from Shanghai
still said that "diplomats arriving from Germany declare that
Hitler is intensely annoyed that Japan bas not formally adhered
to the Axis". 66
The reason tor this indecision. Which lasted so long on the part
of Japan, was that the Japanese Court and Navy circles remained
opposed to any pact which might involve the co~ntry in war with
great sea powers~ especially with the United States. But the
militarists gained more and more influence in the Konoye cab-
inet, and the Japanese attitude changed with rapidity during
the month of September. According to Ambassador Grew, the
Tripartite Pact
became a potential consequence of the trend of Japan-
ese policy from the moment of the establishment of
the Konoye Government, but the pact itself came to a
head with unexpected swiftness. A veil of secrecy had
been draw over the proceedings, whioh were carried
on prinoipal1y by Herr von Stahmer, a special German
emissary, in Tokyo, and although speCUlation was of
course rife, very few people in Tokyo had any idea
that the negotiations would evolve so rapidly. 67
The caUSe of the Japanese swiftness in the conolusion
of the pact was complex. But what played the main role in
Japan's decision could be attributed to its recent ocoupation
of North Indochina. The above-mentioned reports from Shanghai
said also that Hitler "Ls even more intensely annoyed that
Japan is trying to enrich heraelfby attempting to obtain as.
cendency over the colonial possessions of France and the
66. The Ne'wYork Times, August 11,1940
6? Grow, Ten Years In Japan, p.332
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Netherlands". And what Japan mostly needed at the present
moment was Hitler's suppor t , To gain it, the only course
open to the Japanese was to adhere to the Axis. In the end,
the Japanese did. Seoretary Hull remarked correctly that
Japan "had held off her signature until German pressure suc-
ceeded in forcing the Vichy Government to accede to Tokyo
demands". 68
That the pa~t was aimed at the United states seemed ob-
vious from the text of the pact itself, the third article of
which read:
Germany, Italy and Japan ••••further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic and
military means if one of ~he three Contracting Powers
is attack.ed by a Powe~ at present not involved in the
European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.59
Japan was more preoccupied, however, with its expansion-
ist program and the German support thereof. Their efforts
were crowned with success, baoaase the Tripartite Pact almost
repeated textually what Prince Kanoye had announced on August
1, 1940 88 his government's policy: the idea of a living space
tor the Japanese people, the ~hilosophy of 8 new order of
things, and the plan tor a Greater East Asia. The Pact said:
The Goernments ot Germany, Italy and Japan consider
it the pre-requisite ot a lasting peaOe that every nation
in the world sull receive the space to which it is en-
titled. They have, therefore, decided to stand by and co-
operate with one another in their ettorts in Greater East
Asia, and re8iou$ of Europe respectively. In doing this
it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain 8 new
--------------,-----
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order of things, calculated to promote the mutual
prosperity and welfare of people concerned. 70
Of course, the Pact provoked a serious reaction in the
United states. On the same day, after discussing with the
President, Secretary Hull issued the following statement:
The reported agreement of alliance does not, in
the view of the Government of the United Stat,8s, sub-stantially alter a situation Which has existed for
several years. Announcement ot the alliance merely
makes clear to all a relationship which ha$ long ex-isted in effect and to which this Government has re-
peatedly called attention. That such an agreement has
been in process of conclusion has been well known for
some t~e, and that tact has been tully taken intoaccount by the Government of the United States in the
deterri11ningof this eOllntry's policies. 71
The next day, September 28, 1940, while nswapapez-s were
announcing that nwar in the Pacific between America and Japan
has come measurably uearer with startling SUddenness", Under-
Secretary of state delivered an important address entitled:
"Our Foreign Policy and National Defense"; Welles affirmed
that the American pOlicy in the Far East differed in no way
from the American policy in relation to other countries of
the world. He referred to the doctrine of "the open door",
then denounced the Japanese endeavor to create a new order in
Asia by the "instrumentality or armed foree" and by a highhand-
ed course which clearly showed that Japan alonl "shall decide
to What extent the historic interests of the United States and
the treaty rights ot American citizens in the Far East are to
+ -70. Documents on American Foreign RelationsLIII,30471. HUll, gp.ctt., I,969
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be observed". In conolusion, he asserted that from the stand-
point of reason and of common sense, all problems presented
on the Far East could be solved peacefully through negotiations,
provided there existed "a sincere desire on the part of 8lloon-
cerned to find an equitable and a fair solution which would
give just reoognition to the rights and to the real needs of
all oonoerned". 72
And, it Japan openly sided with Germany and Italy, the
United States would stand by Great Britain. Seoretary of
State Hull indicated this direction in his ensuing comment made
on September 30, 1940:
As an ordinary precaution, Japan has had to assume
that whether or not the United States and Great Britainhave express agreements in regard to naval and air base
across the Pacifio and inoluding Singapore, the special
relations between our two countries are suoh that over-
night we could easily establish cooperative relations
for the mutual use of all these bases. 73
That same day, Lord Lothian wanted to know the views of
the American Government about a British announcement on the
reopening of the Burma road, to be effected on October 17, 1940.
Secretary Hull replie~ that the United States "had pursued a
definite and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances
in resisting Japanese aggression and treaty violations during
recent years." Then he emphasized:
72. The New York Times, September 29, 1940, p.2: It announc-
ed the ad~ress of the Under Seer tary of State as follows: -Welles
address: Threat to Indochina Scored in Address by Welles". Se.
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119
The special desire of this Government is to see
Great Britain suoceed the war. Our aots and utter-
anoes with respect to the Pacifio area will be more
or less atfected as to time and extent by the question
of what course will most effectively and legitimately
aid Great Britain in winning the war. 74
On its part, Japan was trying to justify its action, af-
firming that the three-power al11anoe was not aimed at any
partioular country, and appealed to the United states for a
fair understanding. 75
As the Japanese efforts in this sense proved to be of
etfect, at the end the Japanese authorities resolved to
answer threats by threats. ,On October 5, 1940, Prinoe Konoye
departed from his usual calmness and uttered the tatal word.
ot war. He deolared flatly that should the United States
refuse to understand the rea~ intentions of Japan, Germany
and Italy and persist in ohallenging them in the belief that
the recent paot among them represented a hostile aotion a-
gainst the American Government, "there will be no other course
76open to them than to go to war".
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Conclusion
The Road to Pearl Harbor.
From October 1940 to December 1941, the tension between
the United States and Japan grew with the developments of the
Japanese activities in Indochina, until the final break, whioh
resulted in the historic attack by Japan on the American fleet
at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941.
To begin with, the Japanese possessed in North Indochina
a solid foothold for their further advance in other Indoohinese
regions, and consequently into other oountries of Southeast Asia.
The first step was difficUlt, but they had made it. By the
accord of September 22, 1940, with the French authorities, they
had brOUght into Indochina not only their presence, but also
their military forces, which were unquestionably superior to
those of France in that area. Moreover, Japan had secured
the support of the Axis Powers by signing the pact of September
27, with Germany and Italy. What remained to the Konoye Govern-
ment was to go ahead with its program of southward expansion,
despite the opposition of the United States.
On the other part, the United States, after the "green
lightW message ot Ambassador Grew, was more convinoed that
Japan wound be deterred only by a tirm policy which would be
express d by completion of American preparedness and by greater
restrictions ot exports to Japan. But the more the American
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Government took restriotive measures against Japan, the more
the latter beoame irritated and tried to oonsolidateits grab
on Indoohina and Southeast Asia so to esoape the need of Amer-
ican supply. Neither country made conoessions to the other.
On October 8, 1940, the State Department warned American
oitizens to leave the Far East. It stated that it was taking
"precautionary steps" tor the safety of the Americans by
"suggesting" that those who were not detained by essential and
urgent businesses should consider coming out ot "various dis-
turbed areas", among whioh Indoohin was named.l
This step had an immediate reperoussion in Japan. The next
day, the Japanese Foreign Oftice at onoe asked Ambassador Grew
about the action of the United States in "ordering" the Amerioans
in the Far East to evacuate. Ambassador Grew told Vice-Minister
Ohashi that the United States issued no "order" but only a
suggestion as a preoautionary measure. 2
But the United States did not make any secret of its ohall-
enging attitude. On October 12, in an address, President Roose-
velt declared:
The Americans will not be scared or threatened in-
to the ways the,diotators want us to tollow. No combin-
ation of dictator countries of Europe and Asia will halt
us in the path we see ahead for ourselves and tor dem-
ocracy. No oombination ot dictator countries of Eurepe
and Asia will stop the help we are giving to almost the
last free p~ople now fighting to hold them at bay. 3
~.Forelgn Relations ot the United States,Japan,II,ll4
2. Grew, Ten Years Tn"7aR,an, p.31S
3. T~ PuDIie PaRers an~ Andresses ot F.D.R., IX,466
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The "almost last free people", the President talked about
were obviously the British, whose survival depended heavily on
their Empire. The United States, therefore, firmly opposed
the Japanese actions in Indoohina, mostly in order to save the
British ~pire in the Pacific. Along this line, Secretary
Ickes, on October 17, 1940, reminded President Roosevelt that
a real embargo against Japan appeared imperative. In his
letter to the President, he said that "we didn't keep Japan
out of Indochina by oontinuing to ship scrap iron, nor will
we keep Japan out ot the Dutch East Indies by selling it our
oil." 4
While the United States was considering the extension ot
its licensing system, Japan W8$ inVolved in the border dis-
pute between Indochina and Thailand. The Japanese sought to
~pose their mediation, whiohwas finally aooepted by the
contesting countries on January 21, 1941. In consequence,
Franoo-Thai negotiations opened in Tokyo. The outcome of
these negotiations was that both Thailand and Indoohina were
isolated from the influence ot third Powers and integrated
into the Sphere of Greater East Asia.5
The United States was watching olosely the Japanese ac-
tivit~es. It knew that the Japanese soutqward advance was
being pU$hed with all energy by the militarists, that their
4. Roosevelt Pa2ersLSeoretary's File, Box 58,as citedin LangerTs,~he Undeclared War,p.35
5. Deooux,22.cit., p.143; Gaudel,~.oit., pp.llO-115
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stranglehold in Indochina eOBtinued with ever-increasing in-
tensity. According to Ambassador Grew, Japan's acquisition
of naval bases in Cam-ranh Bay, Indochina, was "patent evi-
dence of her intention to acquire jumping-oft tacilities tor
an eventual attack on Singapore". 6
Seoretary HUll, on his part,saw a real possibility of
danger that could not be overlooked by any peaoeful countries.
This was that the military group in oontrol in Japan,
by a sudden, unannounced movement, could any day send
an expedition to the Metherlands East Indies and Sing-
apore. Or they could, inch by inch, and step by step,
get down to advanoed positions in and7around Thailandand the harbor ot Saigon, Indochina.
To oounter this Japanese tide, the United States had
taken a series ot new restriotions:
The proolamation of Deoember 10, 1940, put under the
licensing system the exportation of iron and stee1.8
The proc1a~ation of Deoember 20, 1940, extended the
licensing control to such other artioles and materials as
bromine, strontium, metals and ores, abrasives, equipment
and plans tor th~ produotion ot aviation lUbricating oil,
9eto. ,•••••
The proclamation of January 10, 1941, regul~ted the
exportation of copper, brass and bronze,zino,niokel and
potash. 10
6. Grew, Ten Years in Japan,p.369
7. HUll, op.cit., 11,988
8. Foreigq Relations Q!-1he United states~Jai~,II,232
9. Ibid, II 236
10. JO:reiSB Relations of the ~B!~d statesJJa~an,II,238
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In the months of February and March, other proclamations
followed one another in short intervals: on February 4, pro-
clamation on exportation ot well and refining machinerY,radium,
uranium, and calf and kip kins; 11 on February 25. on export-
ation ot belladonna, atropine, sole leather and belting leather
beryllium. graphlte,eleotrod s. nd aircratt pilot trainers;12
on March 4, on exportation ot cadmium, oarbon black, ooooanut
and other oils. glyoerine. shellac and titanium; jute. borax,
phosphates; model.design.photographlc negatives, documents or
other articles containing a plan or technical information of
any kind which oould be used in oonnection with any proc ss
13or op ration ot any artioles or materials above-mentioned;
on Maroh 27, on exportation of 51 additional items. 14
On March 11, 1941, the President had signed the L nd-
lease Bill, a momentous aid whioh would help Great Britain
to win the war. 15
On April 14, 1941, another proolamation was announoed,
by Which the exportation of all maohinery, of vegetable fibers
and manutaotures, of theobromine, oattein, sodium cyanide,
alaium oyanide and casein. 16
On May 28, 1941, the United States established export eon-
17trol in the Philippine Islands.
11. Foreiss RelationS of the United States~J eaa~II 24112. IbId., II 248,250-
13. IbId., 11,252-4
14. I~, II 258
15. TEe New York Times,Maroh 12,1941,p.1
16. Forei~Relations of the United StatesL~an,II 260-117. Ibid., II,262 +
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To these Amerioan manitestations ot firmness, the Jap-
anese reacted in their own way. Instead ot halting their
conquest, as was expected by the Americans, they were going
to extend it. A Japanese weekly journal, the DiEloma2l, had
indicated this direction, as early as on February 11, 1941:
Japan will have to get iron trom French Indochina
and oil trom the Netherlands East Indies, as Japan
has been prohibited from getting ~hem trom America.
What has made the Japanese concentrate their attention
to the South Seas region is the execution ot an unre-
stricted, blustery policy by the United States. 18
In May, 1941, Japan had ended suocessfully its mediation
in the border dispute between Indoohina and Thailand. In June,
after repeated meetings and deliberations, the Konoye Govern-
ment reoognized that a military occupation ot all Indochina
was essential and urgent. They proceeded with this "wisest
course," and, on July 14, 1941, presented new demands to the
Vichy Government with the warning taat it a favorable reply
could not be obtained by July 20, force would be amployed.
These new demands were substantially that the Japanese should
be al~owed ~o operate necessary land, sea, and air forces in
South Indochina, to occupy eight air and two naval bases in
19the same region.
Negotiations between Franoe and Japan ware opened at
Vichy on July 17, 1941. The French Government could not do
18. Otto D. Tolischus, Througq Jaeanese Elt!, p.10619. Decoux,op.cit.,pp.100-3; Leon Marcnal, chX,Two
Years or DeceEt1on,pp.128-l30,168
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anything but accept the Japanese proposals. On July 21.
a rel1minary agreement was signed which was followed two
days later by local arrangements at Hanoi. The theme of
20"common defense of Indochina" was thus established.
Washington was alarmed by these developments. The
Japanese Ambassador besought the American Government not
to rush to any "hasty conclusion", but the United states
thought it time to retaliate. On JUly 26. 1941. an exe-
cutive order :froze all Japanese tunds and assets in the
United States. And the new measure was jUbilantly hailed
21by the press. This was a "vioious circle of reprisals
and counter-reprisals". Farsighted statesmen pessimistically
22predicted that "the obvious conclusion is eventual war".
But. betore war actually occurred, another vicious
circle took place. It was a succession of proposals and
counter-proposals the United States and Japan presented to
one another. While the American President wanted Japan to
evacuate Indochina "in toto", Japan stated that its troops
would stay in Indochina but would not proceed further. The
American proposals were unacceptable to Japan. just as the
Japanese ones .ere to the United States. Negotiations were
23doo.mod to tailure.
20. Loc.cit.
21. Langer, The~ndeclared War, pp.65l-222. Ibid., p765 -
23. ~.L His Personal Let~ers, 11,1190; F~reisn Re-
!!tlons ot the_Unfted ~~!~es~JaPan, ft, 546-550
p. 127
The Konoye Government chose the way ot negotiations.
It fell, therefore, on October 16, 1~41, end was replaced
by the Government of Hideki Tojo, 8 militarist leader. Tojo
Cam~ to the Premiership to get Japan ready tor war. If he
continued to negotiate with the United States, it was only
a device intended to hold ott Amerioan action until the pro-
24per tLme tor lapan to begin war.
The United States had .0.0 warlike premeditation. It pre-
pared itself tor war in order to strengthen its diplomacy.
Betore the means of negotiations wer~ exhausted, the United
States was caught otf guard by the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, on Dec mber 7, 1941. But, at that t~e, the United
States and Great Britain were already in a position to win
the war against Japan. 25
Secretary Hull summarized the American poliey in 1940
and its result:
It our poliey had shown any signs of weakness or
wavering, Japan would not hesitate to take over all
Indochina and the Netherlands Indies, and p~rhaps
Malaya as well.
Our Far East policy in the months following the
fall ot France gave us another year and a halt in
which to get ready, while denying to Japan many of
the ma~erials needed tor a greater military machine.
It enabled us to extend invaluable help to Britain
so that, when Pearl Harbor o~e, Britain was strongerthan in the summer ot 1940. 20
24. See, tor example, the !ew !2r~ T~es, Ootober 27and 31, 1941.
25. See, tor example, Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, II, 487-528; Winston ChurChill, The Grand1111890e, pp.605-606.
26. Hull. 22.oit., 1,916
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